

DOUBLE ISSUE

BUCHANAN ON ARIEL SHARON'S SHAKEDOWN

JANUARY 13, 2003 • \$3.00

The American Conservative

America the Abstraction

The Tragedy of Globalist Conservatism

By J.P. Zmirak

The Right's Conspiracy-Mongers

Georgie Ann Geyer on the White House War Party

Tom Brokaw's Prairie Populism Goes PC



www.amconmag.com



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



*What steps should the
U.S. take against Iraq?*

*How do we balance
liberty and security?*

*Does school choice
save public schools?*

Tackle these issues and more with over 90 organizations and 1.5 million readers – at Town Hall (www.townhall.com/thoughts).

Town Hall brings together Internet users, public policy organizations, candidates, congressional staff, and political activists to learn about and then discuss conservative thoughts. Town Hall is committed to inform, educate and empower the public online.

Visit Town Hall today to get news and information, read the latest syndicated columns, sign up for news alerts, and exchange your ideas on today's hot issues.

www.townhall.com/thoughts

townhall .com




CONSERVATIVE NEWS AND INFORMATION

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Contents

January 13, 2003 / Vol. 2, No. 1



[COVER]

America the Abstraction

BY J.P. ZMIRAK Neoconservatism owes more to Trotsky than to Burke.
pg. 8

[CULTURE]

Why Belloc Still Matters

BY R.J. STOVE Though reviled in his day, the British Catholic author was astonishingly prescient. pg. 15

[WORLD]

Cousin Marriage Conundrum

BY STEVE SAILER The ancient practice discourages democratic nation-building. pg. 20

[TECHNOLOGY]

Rage Against the Machine

BY WILLIAM S. LIND A modern-day Luddite argues that computers deaden our souls. pg. 23

COLUMNS

7 Patrick J. Buchanan: Ariel Sharon's shakedown

46 Taki: A victory for Sharon's opponent, Amram Mitzna, would be good for Israel—and for us.

ARTICLES

13 D. Dowd Muska: Roswell, the grassy knoll, and Saddam

18 John Laughland: NATO's Left turn

25 William R. Hawkins: Feeding the Chinese tiger

27 Doug Bandow: Toying with the Constitution

29 Arnaud de Borchgrave: Radical Islam on the march

ARTS & LETTERS

32 Steve Sailer: A sci-fi elegy for lost love

33 Georgie Ann Geyer: Woodward shows the War Party at work.

35 Clyde N. Wilson: A libertarian critiques democracy.

36 Correlli Barnett: Statesmen and generals

38 Joe Scotchie: Brokaw's politically-correct prairie populism

40 Harold O. J. Brown: Christianity's Third World prospects

41 K.R. Constantine Gutzman: Tear down this wall (of separation.)

43 Paul Craig Roberts: The myth of market democracy

COVER ILLUSTRATION: KEVIN TUMA

[SPORT]


GIRLS ON THE GREEN

Though the women-at-Augusta-National issue has been percolating for months, no commentary has quite got to the truth of it. Among men who play golf, there is a widespread appreciation of Hootie Johnson's position. This is not because golfers abhor the assault on the right of free association that this kind of pressure on a private club implies. Nor is it that they too understand the need for a woman-free sanctuary where "good ol' boys" can comfortably engage in "locker room talk"—whatever that is.

The reason is that most women golfers play poorly, and thus play very slowly, clogging up the course and spoiling the game for other players. This stark fact, which never makes its way into print, is well-known to the manufacturers of golf equipment. Several years ago, one company began making a necklace for women golfers to help them keep score. After taking a shot, the player would slide a bead from one side to the other, so when the hole was complete it was easy to tally up a "nine" or a "thirteen" or whatever. As such scores are fairly common when women play, one can imagine that a women's foursome frequently spends a long time on a single hole.

At tennis clubs, where the admission of women is not an issue of contention, men don't roll their eyes about the play of women. Female tennis players at the country club level generally do work hard on their games. (Male tennis pros may have something to do with this.) More to the point, poor tennis players do not have an impact on others playing in the same facility the way poor golfers do.

Go to a golf club with a lot of woman members—where wives are admitted as a matter of course. On Saturday afternoon, you will see many in the dining room or playing on the course. Social tournaments attract scores of women



players. But look at the practice tee. All men, or almost all men, struggling to improve their games. The weak twenty-two handicap trying to become a decent sixteen; the sixteen working to become a quite respectable eleven; the eleven striving to become a sharp six. The thirty or forty men on the range all despise their bad shots, revere their good ones. The topped or shanked shot is experienced as a kind of humiliation. Most women don't feel this way—if they did, they would be on the practice range as well.

A strong case can be made that the relative absence of golf-ball striking obsession among women is a kind of sanity, that there are far better ways to spend one's leisure time than compulsive pursuit of a well-grooved swing and solid contact. But the sexes are profoundly different—not just in the distance they can strike the ball (obvious, and not relevant to this argument) but also in how much the ball striking means to them. This explains why so many men who will never get near Augusta National understand that Hootie has a point.

[MEMORY]

KILLING FOR TOLERANCE'S SAKE

Earlier this year, Vanderbilt University stripped the word "Confederate" from its Confederate Memorial Hall, a women's dormitory built in 1935 with money raised by the United Daughters of the Confederacy. In its place now stands Memorial Hall, a monument to the indefinite referent.

The UDC sued for breach of contract, and Jonathan Farley, a Vanderbilt math professor shot back with an op-ed in the *Tennessean*, Nashville's largest paper. Farley, who posed for his university website photo before a portrait of Marxist revolutionary Che Guevara, alleges that the UDC "honors traitors" and calls Confederates "cowards masquerading as civilized men." Missing his own irony, he brands General Nathan Bedford Forrest a "19th century Hitler" and calls Confederate heritage groups "new holocaust revisionists," then in the same breath laments that 1.4 million Southern soldiers were not executed *en masse*. Each "deserved not a hallowed resting

place at the end of his days," he writes, "but a reservation at the end of the gal-lows."

Erin O'Connor, an English professor at the University of Pennsylvania offers this telling comment, "Isn't it wonderful how readily the fight against racism becomes indistinguishable from the worst sorts of supremacist thinking? How quickly the demand for tolerance and inclusion becomes a call for extermination."

[LAW]

THE CONVICTION THAT FAILED

The rape of the still unnamed "Central Park jogger" was the crime of the 1980s that most unnerved white Manhattan-ites. An accomplished woman, investment banker by day, running laps around the reservoir at night, raped, beaten and left for dead by a pack of feral Third World youths. No one was unmoved by the tale. We read of the confessions of the accused and the ridiculous efforts to defame the victim by Al Sharpton & Co. The city's tabloids dwelt again and again on the amorality of the marauders: "It was fun," one of them reportedly told police, a phrase endlessly quoted.

Now another convict's jailhouse confession, backed up by DNA evidence, seems to indicate that New York's rightly fabled cops had the wrong men—correction, the wrong boys, and the five teenagers aged 14-16 who had supposedly listened to rap music and worked themselves in a rape frenzy were not the guilty ones. They were in the park, engaging in more garden-variety muggings, and the NYPD apparently squeezed confessions out of them for the crime every-one needed solved.

No honest person can escape a sense of bafflement, and unease at the story now emerging from District Attorney

Robert Morgenthau's office; it's not Kronstadt or the 1956 Khrushchev speech, not even close. But in terms of upending one's settled beliefs, it's in the same category.

[PROPAGANDA]

DOESN'T PLAY WELL WITH OTHERS

America's crusader complex may influence people, but it isn't winning friends. A new Pew Research Center survey of 38,000 citizens in 44 countries finds U.S. popularity plummeting as our imperial ambitions rise. Reporting "true dislike, if not hatred," the researchers found that "Images of the U.S. have been tarnished in all types of nations: among longtime NATO allies, in developing countries, in Eastern Europe and, most dramatically in Muslim societies."

In Pakistan, just ten percent of the public has a positive view of the U.S. In Egypt, the second largest recipient of American foreign aid, only one in three thinks of us fondly. Even NATO ally Turkey logs just a 30 percent favorability rating—down from 52 percent two years ago. Over the same time period in Europe, German support for the U.S. has dropped from 78 percent to 61 percent, and British favor has fallen from 83 percent to 75 percent.

Respondents in every European country but Bulgaria "are resentful of American cultural intrusion," and follow-up studies among continental allies found that most think our war making is motivated by oil: in France, 75 percent; in Russia, 76 percent; in Germany, 54 percent. In Britain, America's staunchest European supporter, less than half favor the use of force to oust Saddam.

Asked for his reaction to the findings, President Bush blamed "propaganda machines...that paint country in a bad light." Problem is, we're supplying the paint. ■

The American Conservative

Editors

Patrick J. Buchanan
Taki Theodoracopulos

Executive Editor

Scott McConnell

Managing Editor

Kara Hopkins

Assistant Editor

Matthew Alexander

Art Director

Mark Graef

Office Manager

Veronica Yanos

Publishing Consultant

Ronald E. Burr

Advertising Manager

Peter Lenahan

Newsstand Consultant

Rande Davis

The American Conservative, Vol. 2, No. 1, January 13, 2003 (ISSN 1540-966X). AC is published 24 times per year, biweekly (except for double issues in January and August) for \$49.97 per year by The American Conservative, LLC, 1300 Wilson Blvd, Suite 120, Arlington VA, 22209. (703) 875-7600. Periodicals postage pending at Arlington, VA, and additional mailing offices. POSTMASTER: Send address changes to *The American Conservative*, P.O. Box 10829, Riverton, NJ 08076-0829.

Subscription rates: \$49.97 per year (24 issues) in the U.S., \$54.97 in Canada (U.S. funds), and \$69.97 other foreign (U.S. funds). Back issues: \$6.00 (prepaid) per copy in USA, \$7.00 in Canada (U.S. funds). For subscription orders, payments, and other subscription inquiries—by mail: *The American Conservative*, P.O. Box 10829, Riverton, NJ 08076-0829. By phone: 1-800-579-6148 (outside the U.S./Canada call 1-856-786-9042). Via the web: www.amconmag.com. When ordering a subscription please allow 4-6 weeks for delivery of your first issue and all subscription transactions. This issue went to press on December 12, 2002. Copyright 2002 *The American Conservative*. Inquiries to the editor should be sent to letters@amconmag.com.

IMPORTING ANIMAL ABUSE

The immigration moderation organization I head has long included a section on our website that points out the connection between massive immigration, exploding population, and the increase in animal abuse and factory farming. So I was very pleased to see your outstanding piece, "Dominion: The Power of Man, the Suffering of Animals."

Writer Matthew Scully makes a compelling and eloquent argument that factory-farming animals is a grotesque blight on the soul of America. Unfortunately, the reader finishes the piece with a profound sense of helplessness: How will it ever be possible to end this loathsome practice, driven, as it is, by the American god—the marketplace? And how much more difficult will it be to stop the odious factory-farm system with every ten million new consumers we import through immigration ... often from cultures with zero history of respect or mercy for animals? Indeed, in some cultures (southern China's, for example) it is actually believed that the more painfully an animal dies, the better it tastes, and vicious methods are devised to make slaughter as brutal as possible.

CRAIG NELSEN
director, ProjectUSA.org
via email

WHY WE FOUGHT

Stuart Reid, in the Forum, quoting himself, writes: "In June 1940, 86 percent of Americans said they did not want to go to war with Germany. And who can blame them? Hitler was menace to Europe, but not to the United States."

This is the maximum possible misunderstanding of the strategic reality of 1940. Had Great Britain fallen to the Nazis, the British fleet would have been joined to the German, French, and Italian fleets. The United States did not have a two ocean navy, and the Japan-

ese dominated the Pacific. The Atlantic would have become a German Lake. Hitler could without effective opposition have transported two or three million men to Mexico where they would have been welcomed with open arms, having been promised the return of the American Southwest (including Texas and California) to Mexican sovereignty. Fortunately, President Roosevelt (who like TR had been Assistant Secretary of the Navy) understood the role of sea power, and knew that the United States could not be defended if it lost control of the sea lanes to our coasts. FDR asked Winston Churchill to promise that, if Britain fell, the British fleet would sail to Canada. Churchill replied that he could make no such promise, since if Britain fell, he would not be Prime Minister.

HARRY V. JAFFA
Distinguished Fellow, Claremont Inst.
Claremont, Calif.

TEAM B WAS RIGHT

Marin Seiff's essay, "The Return of Team B," about senior Defense Department officials attempting to create congenial intelligence analyses for themselves, is provocative. But it is misleading to describe the record of an earlier effort at obtaining alternative intelligence estimates as "mixed."

A quarter-century ago, the Ford administration created a consciously contrary "Team B" to review the sanguine assessments from CIA analysts ("Team A"). Certainly not "loaded ... with bright young neocons," the Team B exercise was "like putting Walt Whitman High against the Redskins," as one Agency official observed at the time.

To be sure, Team B's conclusions contained mistakes. However, Harvard professor Richard Pipes, presidential adviser Paul Nitze, and other skeptics of *détente* were fundamentally correct on all the key issues: the accuracy of MIRV-

equipped Soviet missiles; the scope of Soviet civil defense; the ABM treaty violations; and, certainly, the emerging Soviet capability to wipe out U.S. ICBMs in a first strike. Indeed, as we now know, sometimes Team B underestimated.

Beyond the need for good history, why is this significant today? Because such reality checks can be healthy at times of acute uncertainty. For the CIA to insist otherwise, as it apparently did in the latest turf battle, is a poor show of confidence in its own advice.

DEREK LEEBAERT
Washington, D.C.

BAMBOOZLED

Your interview with Norman Mailer was quite interesting. In fact it may have accomplished a goal of yours: It got me—a leftist with some conservative instincts—to spend \$3 on the magazine. All was going well until I read Mr. Theodoracopulos' closing column, "On the Left Bank." The tale of dissembling to get an interview with James Jones was instructive of Mr. T's character; then his character judgment of George W. Bush as "a very smart and decent man" made me vomit, especially after the portrait of this modern Caesar painted by Mailer in Mr. T's interview. I must conclude, like Jones, "I've been conned by a fascist."

So, OK, you bamboozled me once. And it was fun. But I think I'll stick with Paul Krugman, whose character judgment I trust and who probably doesn't have a yacht.

JOHN GRANT
Philadelphia, Penn.

The American Conservative welcomes letters to the editor. Submit letters by e-mail to letters@amcon-mag.com, by fax to 703-875-3350, or by mail to 1300 Wilson Blvd., Suite 120, Arlington, VA 22209. Please include your name, address, and phone number. We reserve the right to edit all correspondence for space and clarity.

Ariel Sharon's Shakedown

"Tough Love for United," exclaimed the *Wall Street Journal*, as it congratulated Uncle Sam for stiffing United Airlines' plea for \$1.8 billion in loan guarantees.

Rebuffed, the beloved old airline had to declare its bankruptcy.

It's all for the best, the *Journal* assures us, "maybe this tough love rejection will start a new government precedent, or at least we can dream." Fine. May we now expect the *Journal* to call on Mr. Bush to reject the \$10 billion in loan guarantees demanded by Ariel Sharon? Don't bet on it.

Yet, Sharon's demand is astonishing in its audacity. California and New York face huge budget shortfalls. The U.S. Treasury is running a deficit nearing \$200 billion. Yet, Sharon, who ignored Bush when the president publicly called on him to pull his army out of West Bank cities, is demanding that U.S. taxpayers fork over \$4 billion in new military aid and agree to pay off \$10 billion Israel intends to borrow should Israel decide to default.

Why should we do this? What does America get out of this? What has all the \$100 billion in aid we have shoveled out to Israel bought us, other than ingratitude and the enmity of the Arab world?

While Israel has a first-rate military, it is of no use to us. In Desert Storm, Bush I had to bribe Yitzhak Shamir with \$5 billion in aid, \$400 million in loan guarantees, and Patriot missiles to stay out of the fighting, lest Israeli intervention dynamite our coalition. Journalists and diplomats alike, returning from the Mideast, attest that our almost-blind support of Israel is a major cause of the anti-Americanism that is sweeping the Islamic world.

When the price of Israel could be paid

in dollars alone, \$3 billion a year, most members of Congress chose to pony up rather than face the retribution of an Israeli Lobby that has in its trophy case the scalps of two chairmen of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, J. William Fulbright and Chuck Percy.

But now the price of the Israeli connection has begun to rise. U.S. weapons technology given to Israel has been sold to China. Only direct U.S. intervention prevented Israel from selling Beijing AWACS technology. The Patriot missile, the Phoenix air-to-air missile, the Lavi fighter, based on the F-16, have all been sold to Beijing.

In the Reagan era, Israel had the loathsome Jonathan Pollard, whom it suborned into treason, loot our innermost national security secrets, some of which are believed to have been traded to Moscow. Israel refuses to return the roomful of documents it stole and has pressured presidents for Pollard's release so he can be brought to Israel where he is a hero.

Now Mr. Sharon has handed us Israel's bill for abstaining from war with Iraq while President Bush is at maximum political risk. Not since 1957, when Dwight Eisenhower ordered Ben-Gurion to get his army out of Sinai, has a U.S. president faced down an Israeli Prime Minister.

To his credit, the president's father tried. In 1991, having driven Iraq out of Kuwait, with his approval at 70 percent, Bush I was asked by Shamir for \$10 billion in loan guarantees to bring a million Russian Jews to Israel. Bush assented,

on one condition: Shamir must not settle them on the West Bank and must stop expanding settlements.

Shamir rejected the condition, and the Lobby went to work. Bush warned he would veto the guarantees. An Israeli minister called him an anti-Semite. While Shamir was defeated in June of 1992, Bush, his own election in trouble, eventually gave in and gave Israel the loan guarantees. Who was the Housing Minister who announced new settlements even as Bush I was denouncing them? Ariel Sharon.

Sharon now wants to repeat Israel's victory over Bush's father by making the son give Israel \$4 billion in hardware and \$10 billion in new loan guarantees as Sharon's price for permitting us to crush Iraq while he holds America's coat. It is a shakedown: Ariel Sharon's big sting

What should Bush do? Tell Sharon the loan guarantees will not even be taken up until he begins to dismantle all the settlements he has begun to build since George W. took office. And if Sharon attempts to roll him in Congress, he, Bush, will go to the country and roll Sharon.

In short, stand up for U.S. national interests and declare America's independence. Israel may be our ally in the war on terror. We are not Israel's ally in its war on the Palestinians. Our commitment is to Israel's security, not its settlements, which are the cause of the intifada.

Sharon's opponent in January's election, General Mitzna, has agreed to negotiate with the Palestinians on the basis of Camp David and to begin withdrawals from the West Bank and Gaza. If Israeli politicians can stand up to Sharon, why cannot U.S. presidents? If members of the Knesset can refuse to follow the suicidal path of Sharon & Netanyahu, why is Congress so cowardly? ■

[the trotskyite persuasion]

America the Abstraction

The neoconservative attempt to package the American ideal for export betrays our citizens at home and foments chaos abroad.

By J.P. Zmirak

I WILL NEVER FORGET the night I was called “un-American.” I sat at a bachelor friend’s birthday party, which he had thrown for himself, with several six packs of industrial-grade beer and a foil tray of take-out lasagna. A grim affair. But this was no ordinary night in Staten Island. Two of the guests were regular editorial writers for the *Wall Street Journal*. One, a brilliant young import from Eastern Europe, brought up the question of immigration. (He had heard that I hold unorthodox views.) Like his colleague, he supports the *Journal*’s proposed constitutional amendment: “There shall be open borders,” and he wanted to know if I agreed.

So I explained that I thought the U.S. needed to accept reduced numbers of immigrants for a decade at least to encourage those who are already here to assimilate, as my grandparents had, and to reduce the downward pressure on the wages of the working poor. It is hard for people to leave the welfare rolls, I suggested, when they face an onslaught of competition for low-skill jobs from legal and illegal immigrants.

He snorted. His native-born colleague smirked. Then they took turns explaining to me how superior Latino and Asian immigrants are to native-born American poor folk, especially blacks. They did not shrink from mentioning IQ, but their main focus was on the “mentality” of people who grew up inside the welfare system compared to that of recent arrivals from the developing world. They freely cracked jokes about the “shiftlessness” and resentful attitudes they had encountered with black Americans contrasted to the earnest, dutiful, eager-to-please behavior of domestic servants, busboys, and cooks from Latin America. As if to expiate the apparent racism of what they had said, they assured me that they also cherished Jamaican nannies and Haitian fruit-vendors, whose attitudes were ever so much more “co-operative” than the sullen, unionized minorities they found working at the Post Office.

“Even if all that were true,” I said carefully, “we can’t just leave people on the welfare rolls to rot.” How, I asked, do you re-introduce the work ethic in


sectors of society where it has been lost, while supporting an immigration policy that pushes wages so low that they barely exceed welfare benefits? What will happen to those native-born Americans?”

They shrugged. The question did not interest them. They knew they would never live anywhere near “those people,” so what did it matter?

And then the *émigré* leaned forward, brow knitted, to confide a new insight. “They’re not real Americans,” he said in a thick Slavic accent. The people who show up wanting to work, who aren’t afraid of 12 hour days, who set up shops in Chinatown and put their whole families to work from childhood on—people who put their faith in capitalism, those were the real Americans. “Not those resentful parasites. Just because they happen to live here, that doesn’t make them Americans.”

I inquired, “So what does?”

He went on to explain that what makes someone an American, regardless of where he lives, is a belief in the unfettered free market, a support for



KEVIN TUMA

secularism and mass democracy, and an optimistic faith in the future.

"I don't accept all those things," I said. "For one thing, as a Catholic ..."

"Then you're not a real American," he finished.

That took me aback. I almost let it pass, let him natter on with his friend, to consider the argument won—as I am sure happens all the time to this sort of person, reinforcing his sense that he is infallible. But I have too much Irish blood in me for that.

"I was born here, pal," I said through clenched teeth. "My father served under Patton, along with the fathers and grandfathers of plenty of those 'resentful parasites.' Didn't that service earn their descendants a special stake in

America?" I resisted the urge to bring up what I knew of this fellow's background—how his grandfather helped Stalin implement the Ukrainian famine. "How about all the free labor their ancestors put in as slaves?"

The elder editorialist gave a chortle. "Oh, so I guess you're in favor of reparations, too? Al Sharpton, call your office!"

I shook my head, realizing at last why so many people hate self-styled "conservatives." I went on: "Don't you think being born here, and loving the place and the people, along with the system of government, means something?"

"Where you're born," the ex-Soviet said, batting the air as if at a misconceived chess move, "it's so arbitrary. It's of no ideological significance."

In a way, he was right. If you are trying to boil down citizenship to its philosophically respectable components, and if ideology is all you are interested in, then it does not really matter where you were born. Or who your parents were. Or whom you love. Or the hymns you know by heart, the folk tales you treasure, the God you worship. None of these merely human matters measures up, ideologically speaking. None of them can be enshrined in a manifesto, or beamed across the world via Voice of America, or exported in music videos. They do not raise the GDP, or lower the interest rate, or increase our command of oil reserves. They cannot be harnessed to drive the engine of globalization. Therefore, to some people, these

things do not matter. Such pieties can be harnessed in the run-up to a war, can form part of the Army recruitment ads and propaganda campaigns, and may even find their way into presidential speeches. But essentially there is no difference between a fourth-generation American and an Afghan refugee who just landed at JFK—so long as they both accept the same ideology.

MARXISM APPEALED MORE TO INTELLECTUALS THAN OUR OWN CONSTITUTION AND DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE.

How did we get to this pass? How did conservatism, which once centered on the fierce defense of tradition, religion, and particularism, turn into an ideology—that is, a philosophy in arms, a political system shorn of its ties to real people and places, slimmed down by dropping historical baggage, packaged for export on the global market of ideas? The simple answer is the Cold War. With the end of World War II, the U.S. faced for the first time since 1812 a foreign enemy that could actually strike its shores, damage its cities, devastate its infrastructure. What's more, we faced not just a foreign enemy, pursuing global domination at our expense and that of our allies, but something unprecedented at home: a political philosophy opposed to American democratic capitalism that appealed to many Americans.

In the early 20th century, there was mass support for socialist and Communist parties in America. This had dried up by the dawn of the Cold War—in the U.S., if not in Europe, where Soviet-sponsored parties came tantalizingly close to power in France and Italy. But the appeal of Marxism to intellectuals was strong—in part because it was more ideological than the mixed philosophy of governance found in our own Constitution and Declaration of Inde-

pendence. As Peter Augustine Lawler explains in *Aliens in America: The Strange Truth About Our Souls*, we find in our founding documents an impure compound: Locke's Deist individualism, an elite doctrine accepted by leaders among the Founders, admixed with the Augustinian Christianity accepted almost unanimously by Americans at the time. (One could argue that a major-

ity still do accept it, adding up the church-going Catholics, Southern Baptists, black church members, and other conservative Protestants.) In other words, our founding philosophy was a political compromise between two incompatible doctrines, which have functioned in a creative tension ever since. Not very satisfying to a political pamphleteer or coffeehouse radical and downright frustrating to the young intellectual. Marxism, on the other hand, has an immense theoretical machinery, carefully developed on the basis of rigorous Hegelian reasoning, ruthless in its consistency, easily harnessed to the analysis of every facet of existence. Grad students in the humanities find it almost irresistible—a sausage grinder through which you can feed any work of literature or art and produce a reliable A-paper on "The Economic Underpinnings" of fill-in-the-blank. Jane Austen. The Book of Job. Whatever.

The post-war conservative movement labored mightily to craft an alternative, a version of Americanism that could be promoted internationally, which Europeans and Asians, Latins and Africans alike could adopt as an alternative to Marxism. The best intellectual formulation this effort produced can be found in the work of Frank Meyer, whose

"Fusionism" tried to bridge the gap between libertarian economics and traditional Christian conservatism. We ought not to sneer at what this "movement" conservatism achieved; our victory in the Cold War, never a foregone conclusion, may well be traceable in part to the hard work done over at the humble offices of *National Review*.

Nor should we overlook the contributions of neoconservatives, even when we find their foreign policy ideas wrong-headed or extreme. The hard-headed policy analyses, number-crunching, and empirical studies undertaken by converts from the Left added immeasurably to the force of philosophical arguments long offered by the Right against the growth of government and the appeasement of the Soviet Union. In domestic policies, some have argued that federal support for civil rights legislation in the U.S. was driven mainly by Cold War concerns: the ugly spectacle of Jim Crow and black disenfranchisement provided excellent propaganda for the Soviets. So the FBI got involved in the struggle against bigoted sheriffs and all-white juries. We should be thankful for at least this side-effect of Yalta.

That said, it is worth re-assessing some of the weaknesses of Americanism-for-export. For one thing, we are no longer in a Cold War. The misnamed "War on Terror" has been recast on the model of the Cold War, perhaps out of intellectual laziness or the strength of long-held habit. In fact, it could hardly be more different than the global confrontation with Communism. Then, we faced a heavily armed, centrally-directed enemy, with universities and intelligence services, with thousands of highly-educated American intellectuals in sympathy, which purported to promote a "progressive," "scientific" political theory of modern Western origin. Their goal was conquest and domination of the West.

Today, we seek out renegades and bandits, armed with weapons aimed mostly at civilians, funded by secret transfers of drug and oil money, who cleave to a pre-medieval creed, a fanatical variant of a variant of Islam, repulsive to intellectuals, oppressive to women, inimical in every way to the Western tradition. Their weapon is sabotage (now renamed "terrorism"), a weakling's tactic as old as war itself. Their goal is the expulsion of Western influence from a strategically vital region and the destruction of a valued American ally, Israel. While these outcomes are unacceptable, they are not of the same order as the Soviet conquest of Europe and North America or international proletarian revolution. Nor, in the light of America's hunger for oil and Israel's nuclear deterrent, are they remotely likely to be achieved.

The Cold War habits and language that still dominate in conservative circles distort this reality and lead to rhetorical absurdities such as the "axis of evil" and to such downright silly claims as President Bush's assertion that Islamists want to "take away our freedom." Respectfully, Mr. President, they just want to take away our oil.

In understanding the dynamics of Cold War conservatism, it is worth digging a little in the rubbish pile of Soviet history—since so many of the great thinkers on the Right are former Stalinists and Trotskyites. There is a key difference between them. Old Stalinists such as Whittaker Chambers were schooled to support "socialism in one country," to promote the concrete interests of a given polity, the Soviet Union. This trained them in a kind of perverse particularism and made them ready to defend the concrete institutions of a given place—however evil. The Trotskyites, on the other hand, were bound by no such constraints. Because they supported a global Marxist revolution,

and a system which had no national host on which it could feed, they were able to function much more in the mold of Jacobins, of "pure" revolutionaries unfettered by national interest and *realpolitik*. This—along with the unspeakable crimes of Stalin—made Trotskyism vastly more appealing to serious thinkers than simple Soviet loyalty. As a pure ideology, it attracted more intellectual converts—while dutiful Stalinism tended to attract more of the dim-witted "joiners" and "movement" types, who prefer a pre-digested creed. (Obvious exceptions to this rule include Chambers and Arthur Koestler.)

So the Right was lucky to attract bright, disillusioned Trotskyites such as James Burnham, Sidney Hook, and Irving Kristol into its ranks. They brought with them vast talents, literary learning, and serious moral concern for universal issues of human rights. But they also carried a strong tendency towards pure abstraction, towards viewing national questions purely in ideological terms. They defended America bravely during the Cold War—but they did so not as our homeland, as the particular place where a people and their treasured institutions took root,

were "the only two large nations in the world today that were born out of a self-conscious creed, and whose very existence as nations is justified and defined in creedal terms."

In *The Neoconservative Mind*, Gary Dorrien traces the origin of abstractionist Americanism to the work of James Burnham—the great theoretician of "rollback" anti-Communism. Formerly a leading member of Trotsky's Fourth International, Burnham had become completely disillusioned with Marxism and turned into a vigorous anti-Communist and American nationalist—without really reconciling himself to most aspects of his native country. Ferociously committed to an all-fronts war against a Soviet Union still ruled by Stalin and inclined to expand in Europe, Asia, and even Latin America, Burnham made clear in his famous call to arms *The Struggle for the World* that he was more devoted to the abstract mission of America than to any of her concrete attributes. Examined by contrast with the well-oiled, fanatical machinery of the Communist empire, America simply did not measure up. Burnham professed himself disgusted with the flabbiness, short-sightedness, sentimentalism, and

THE RIGHT WAS LUCKY TO ATTRACT BRIGHT, DISILLUSIONED TROTSKYITES SUCH AS JAMES BURNHAM, SIDNEY HOOK, AND IRVING KRISTOL INTO ITS RANKS.

but rather as the (almost accidental) spot where certain ideas had taken hold. Those ideas—unmoored from the institutions and historical realities that nurtured them—became the important thing. The country itself became secondary to the ideas it used to govern itself, which it lived in order to instantiate and spread around the world. As Irving Kristol famously wrote, the United States and the Soviet Union were alike in one key respect—they

provincialism of American politicians—as evidenced by the brief resurgence of pre-war isolationism just after World War II and the reluctance with which many Americans moved from hot to Cold War.

As Burnham wrote: "It was the members of Congress, not the soldiers, who showed real cowardice and blindness when they responded to the complaints of the soldiers not by pointing out to them the responsibilities of world

power but by yielding to the homesickness, and seeking demagogically to gain a few cheap votes by joining in the clamor to bring the boys home at whatever cost to the interests of the nation—and of the world.” Such a paragraph could have been written in 2002 by a civilian hawk appalled at the reluctance of many to invade Iraq. Indeed, the chasm dividing the conservative movement over the Iraq war and related foreign manifestations of the War on Terror mirrors in many ways the post-war split among Republicans between interventionists and small-government, “America First” conservatives—to personify the matter, between James Burnham and Robert Taft.

Historian David Gress cogently analyzes Cold Warriors’ addiction to abstraction in his study *From Plato to NATO*. Gress writes that the growth of ordered liberty in the West has always been made possible by the existence of particular institutions, without which the abstract defense of individual rights becomes impossible: in Switzerland, the fierce independence of the cantons, and the direct democracy practiced there since the early Middle Ages; in the U.S., the congregational structures of Calvinist churches, the town meetings of New England; in Italy, the free cities such as Florence and Venice; in Germany, the fractious nobles of the Holy Roman Empire and civic alliances such as the Hanseatic League; throughout Medieval Europe, the existence of the Church as an alternative locus of loyalty to the State; all these concrete, particular roots made possible the growth of liberal government in the West. Their relative absence in most of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East makes democracy hard to export to such alien climes. Such an export was possible in Japan only after a massive defeat of the nation’s elites, the discrediting of the national religion—Shintoist emperor-

worship—and a prolonged military occupation in the midst of a nuclear-powered Cold War.

Some of the particularist Western institutions, which Gress labels the “Old West,” have distinctly illiberal elements: the rustic half-canton of Appenzell-Outer-Rhododien—a venerable democracy where all citizens still vote, once a year, by show of hands in the public square—only gave women the vote in the late 1980s. Women are distinctly less powerful than men in most Christian denominations. The Constitution enshrined slavery. And so on. These elements interfere with making a purely ideological case for freedom in the West, and so they tended to drop out of Cold War accounts of the growth of liberty. Instead, Gress argues, Cold War writers gravitated

profoundly Western roots of our culture. For this reason, Gress argues, Cold War conservatives have rendered themselves helpless against multiculturalism—and undermined the concrete foundations upon which the edifice of American freedom stands.

To conservatives schooled in this mode of argument, restrictions on immigration are simply insane; anyone, anywhere who will sign on to the Declaration of Independence is already an American. Keeping him out makes no more sense than building a Berlin Wall to divide Manhattan’s East Side from its West. Embittered blacks, or religious conservatives, or leftists who do not accept the Cold War ideology of America are not real Americans. An ideological litmus test becomes the standard of

FOR COLD WAR CONSERVATIVES **ANYONE, ANYWHERE** WHO WILL SIGN ON TO THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE **IS ALREADY AN AMERICAN.**

towards a Jacobin reading of history, which focused on documents, slogans and abstractions, at the expense of the concrete realities, limits, and inconsistencies that marked the slow expansion of free, representative government.

The messy history and imperfectly liberal institutions that conservatives used to argue—following Montesquieu and Tocqueville—made freedom practicable in the West were swept aside. Increasingly, America was defined according to the most expansive, abstract reading of the Declaration of Independence, combined with a version of market economics well-suited to the unrestricted “pursuit of happiness.” Anything that did not fit that formula tended to fall down the memory hole: the Anglo-Celtic roots of the Founding, the specifically Christian (mostly Protestant) identity of America, the very existence of the Confederacy, and the

citizenship. American foreign policy must cease to pursue the concrete interests of a concrete, national community and become the tool by which an abstract creed is imposed across the world—hindered only by the resistance of the benighted and bigoted, who are fated to end on the ash-heap of history.

Such a creed is dangerous to the country that espouses it. It sets an impossible standard by which all its actions will be judged and invites well-founded charges of hypocrisy. It enrages and goads enemies. It alienates home-grown patriots. Most tragically, it invites the attacks of fanatical young men on American civilians—as it did on September 11, 2001, in my hometown, New York City. ■

J.P. Zmirak is the author of Wilhelm Röpke: Swiss Localist, Global Economist.

Roswell, the Grassy Knoll, and Saddam

The War Party's conspiracy chicks

By D. Dowd Muska

J. W. RESER WILL probably have a Blue Christmas this year.

Just a few months ago, he was a Tulsa International Airport police officer and a key witness in a blockbuster congressional investigation some believed would finally reveal the cover-up behind the second-worst terrorist attack in American history.

Today, Reser has lost his job, his testimony has been discredited, and he soon may be indicted for lying to Congress.

But you are not likely to hear much about his misfortunes from the Fox News Channel or read about them on the editorial page of the *Wall Street Journal*. This is because Reser's recent credibility problems undercut one of the War Party's favorite conspiracy theories: that Iraq was involved in the 1995 bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City.

One by one, the justifications for invading Iraq have been exposed as hollow. The links between Iraq and al-Qaeda? Iraq's role in the anthrax mailings? The likelihood that Saddam Hussein will give "weapons of mass destruction" to terrorists? All have been revealed to be flimsy or even false reasons to launch Gulf War II. And as their list of pretexts has withered, the on-to-Baghdad boys—with the assistance of lazy media outlets that transmit any allegation, however ludicrous—have stooped to dredging up long-discredited theories about Iraqi involvement in prior terrorists attacks on America.

This lowering of standards has not contributed to an honest debate over Iraq, but it has been good news for Jayna Davis and Laurie Mylroie, the Thelma and Louise of Saddam conspiracy-mongering. The former believes Iraqis were involved in the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, and the latter has convinced herself that Saddam orchestrated the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center.

Davis is a former local-television reporter who got into the Oklahoma City conspiracy industry on the ground floor. Seven weeks after the bombing, she filed a report for NBC's Oklahoma City affiliate KFOR claiming that the infamous "John Doe No. 2," a possible McVeigh accomplice, was a local Iraqi refugee named Al-Hussaini Hussain.

But exactly one week after Davis's report aired, officials announced that John Doe No. 2 was not Hussain. An employee of the rental agency where McVeigh obtained the truck he used to bomb the Murrah Building, investigators concluded, had mistakenly associated McVeigh with another customer. The resemblance between Todd Bunting, an off-duty army private who had never even met McVeigh, and the description the employee gave of McVeigh's mythical companion was so striking that once the FBI located and spoke to Bunting, it immediately called off the nationwide manhunt for John Doe No. 2.

Unwilling to accept that her "scoop" was baseless, Davis has dedicated her life to proving that, as she told the *Wall Street Journal* in September, "a Middle Eastern terrorist cell" was involved in the bombing and is "still operating today" in Oklahoma City. Her allegation rests primarily on over 20 witnesses who claim to have seen Hussain—who Davis insists was indeed John Doe No. 2—and "other Arab men" with McVeigh and co-conspirator Terry Nichols.

Federal prosecutors rejected the theory that Muslim terrorists played a part in the bombing, and during the 1997 trials of both McVeigh and Nichols, no information surfaced that corroborated Davis's version of the attack. Things got worse for Davis and her ilk in December 1998, when an 18-month Oklahoma County grand jury probe of the bombing not only exonerated the federal government's investigation, but also castigated—and in one case, indicted—the conspiracy theorists who profited from the attack.

The grand jurors, who interviewed Davis for several hours and examined the documents she supplied to them, concluded that the "so-called Middle Eastern connection—based on the evidence available—simply did not exist."

Oklahoma Governor Frank Keating, a Republican, voiced his hope that the grand jury's report would "put an end to unfounded conspiracy theories and irresponsible claims about the bombing"—

a sentiment echoed by the state's Democratic attorney general, who had long criticized "the worst kind of paranoid conspiracy pandering" surrounding the attack.

Predictably, the report did nothing to silence the conspiracy crowd. And that brings us back to J.W. Reser's troubles. Earlier this year, the ever-obstinate Davis—who has written neither a book nor a single print article about her theory, preferring to spoon-feed her claims to sympathetic editorial writers, online publications, and cable news programs—persuaded Rep. Dan Burton, chairman of the House Committee on Government Reform, to examine her claims.

So far, not good. Last month, the committee revealed that Reser, one of Davis's marquee witnesses, has problems telling the truth. Investigators are now convinced that Reser lied when he told them that while working as a civilian employee for the Navy, he viewed a videotape taken the day of the bombing that shows a Middle Eastern man with McVeigh's rented truck. The Navy searched its records and could not find any evidence that Reser had ever worked for it or that it had ever had any videotape of the bombing. This deception, along with other fibs about his employment history, prompted Burton to sic the Justice Department on Reser, who has been fired from his job at Tulsa's airport.

Her investigative skills may be lacking, but Jayna Davis is Hercule Poirot compared to Laurie Mylroie. In 1987, Mylroie, a former Harvard professor now with the American Enterprise Institute, co-wrote an article in the *New Republic* that recommended U.S. support for Saddam Hussein because Iraq was "now the de facto protector of the regional status quo."

Eight years later, Mylroie had a somewhat different view of Saddam. In the

Winter 1995/1996 issue of the *National Interest* she first laid out her theory that the 1993 World Trade Center attack was the work not of a motley group of Muslim radicals but rather of Iraqi intelligence. In 2000, AEI greenlit an entire book on the subject.

Outside the tiny neocon echo chamber, Mylroie's *Study of Revenge: Saddam Hussein's Unfinished War Against America* received scant attention. But the book gained new life after 9/11, when uber-editor Judith Regan's ReganBooks, an imprint of Rupert Murdoch's HarperCollins, hastily reprinted it as *The War Against America: Saddam Hussein and the World Trade Center Attacks*. (Note the "s" at the end of the last word in the new title—an attempt to tie Saddam not only to the first attack, but the second as well.)

Egged on by former CIA Director James Woolsey, Saddam paranoiacs have cited Mylroie's theory relentlessly since 9/11. Yet few of the hawks who brandish Mylroie's book appear to have closely scrutinized her claims. If they had done so, they would have noticed that she has not found any physical evidence that links Iraq to the bombing. Her case rests entirely on assumption and speculation.

Mylroie's most outrageous claim is that terror mastermind "Ramzi Yousef," who oversaw the bombing and almost pulled off a scheme to bomb U.S. commercial jets in the Far East, was not the alias of Abdul Basit, a Pakistani raised in Kuwait who attended college in England. In Mylroie's world, there was an Abdul Basit, but he was murdered during Saddam's occupation of Kuwait. Yousef, she believes, is an Iraqi agent who obtained Basit's records and used them years later to obtain a passport that allowed him to leave the U.S. after bombing the World Trade Center for Saddam. (Mylroie makes this enormous leap of logic based entirely on a few

minor and easily explainable inconsistencies in Basit's travel documents.)

Yousef, who was apprehended in Pakistan in 1995, is now serving a life sentence in federal prison. It is true that many disturbing questions continue to linger about who he is and how he became one of the deadliest terrorists in history. But the information that has surfaced links Yousef not to Saddam Hussein but to Osama bin Laden. Terrorism experts now believe that Yousef is a relative of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, a top al-Qaeda official who is still at large. (Yousef may have trained at an al-Qaeda camp in the early 1990s.) And even the White House has toned down its reckless rhetoric about ties between al-Qaeda and Iraq. More than a year of intense investigations conducted in every corner of the world—and the examination of captured al-Qaeda records in Afghanistan—has yielded no credible evidence of a connection.

None of this matters to Mylroie, of course, her book even suggests that Saddam was behind the bombings of U.S. facilities in Saudi Arabia in 1995 and 1996, as well as the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Such harebrained notions prompted Edward Peck, a former U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, to offer this memorable assessment of her obsession: "I think Dr. Mylroie has got a real phobia about this, and if she possibly could, she would accuse [Saddam Hussein] of being responsible for male pattern baldness in the United States."

Ultimately, Davis's and Mylroie's conspiracy theories tell us very little about Iraq's role in terror attacks on America. But they do illuminate the intellectual depths to which the War Party will sink to settle its grudge against Saddam Hussein. ■

D. Dowd Muska is a freelance writer in Connecticut.

[depressive realism]

Why Belloc Still Matters

Was Hilaire Belloc sometimes careless? Yes. Impolitic? Certainly.
Is he irrelevant to 21st-century concerns? Never.

By R. J. Stove

AN AUTHOR TOO ROBUST and significant to be wholly un-personned can still be marginalized. Consider this elegant pasquinade, which years ago won a parody-contest award in Britain's *New Statesman* and which employs the same rhyme scheme and meter as Hilaire Belloc's own "The chief defect of Henry King":

The chief defect of dear Hilaire
Was not the clothes he used
to wear,
The curious hat and monstrous
cloak,
Paraded as some kind of joke.
No, Hilaire's fault, and well he
knew it,
Was, all he did, he'd overdo it . . .
There's more—he held the
strongest views
On politicians, and on Jews,
Such as, today, might give
one cause
To think of Race Relations Laws.
But that of Belloc is the worst
That can be said. His comic verse,
His *Cautionary Tales*, his *Peers*,
His *Beasts* will last for countless
years,
Delighting readers old or young
Who share Hilaire's adopted tongue.

Well, that's put Dear Hilaire back in his box, hasn't it? If Belloc's entire literary merit lies in his having catered to the A.A. Milne and Edward Lear demographic, we need no more bother ourselves with his wider aims than seek deep epistemological insight from re-reading about Pooh Bear or The Dong With The Luminous Nose. But then the *New Statesman* has never claimed theological expertise. Others, who do possess such claims, and who in many instances share Belloc's Catholicism, have been at least as hostile. Malcolm Muggeridge complained, "although he has written about religion all his life, there seemed to be very little in him." Six years before the *Latin Mass*'s recent anti-Belloc enfilade, St. Louis University's James Hitchcock (in the May 1996 issue of *Crisis*) likened Belloc to "a man with a machine gun—by spraying shots everywhere he inevitably hit some targets, but many of his bullets went astray." This allegation can at any rate be argued over, unlike certain antics of the occasional self-confessed Belloc fan. (Such as John Anderson, who passed as the doyen of Australian philosophy during the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s and who labored with surrealistic persistence to reinterpret Belloc's *Servile State* as a sacred text for antipodean atheist head-kickers. When

Belloc's friends included historical illiterates like Anderson, he hardly needed foes.)

How stands the case for the prosecution? In particular, was G.M. Trevelyan, Regius Professor of History at Cambridge 1927-1940, justified in having flatly called Belloc "a liar"?

Occasionally, alas, yes. Belloc confided as much himself, to a co-religionist at that: the British historian, newspaperman, and editor Douglas Woodruff. While going several debating rounds in print against his merciless ultra-Protestant detractor, the once-celebrated controversialist G.G. Coulton, Belloc came out with one assertion so breathtakingly implausible that it moved Woodruff to inquire, "But is it true?" "Oh, not at all", Belloc retorted. "But won't it annoy Coulton?" Such a deliberate, impolitic falsehood clearly sprang from insensate bravado rather than from malice. It is doubtful, moreover, whether the historian who hastily and occasionally deceives others is half as dangerous as the historian who consistently and lucratively deceives himself. (Many a reader obligated to plow through the unrelenting sanctimony of more recent and more fashionable gurus than Belloc—Arthur Schlesinger expounding the immaculate conception of JFK; Eric Hobsbawm assigning a similar redemp-

tive role to the proletariat; Francis Fukuyama hyperventilating about free-market dogma's limitless appeal to any polity, however Lower Slobbovian—must have felt increasingly inclined to welcome from these sources an honest lie or two.) Still, Belloc's mendacity at that juncture defies excuses and leaves behind a singularly nasty odor.

An even graver sin, curiously slighted by Belloc's most recent biographers, A.N. Wilson (*Hilaire Belloc*, 1984) and Joseph Pearce (the shorter, more reverential *Old Thunder: A Life of Hilaire Belloc*, 2002), occurs repeatedly in Belloc's analyses of the French Revolution. Notwithstanding the fervor with which pope after pope—especially, in Belloc's youth, St. Pius X—had declared support for Jacobins and indeed Girondins to be incompatible with the most basic Christian decency, Belloc remained as euphonic as any Charles James Fox about the entire pageant of French politics from the Bastille's fall via Robespierre to Napoleon. Revolutionary genocide against the Vendéens and Chouans scarcely touched Belloc's consciousness. On his last (1937) tour of the U.S., he accused Americans of wanting to hear "48,376,277 times . . . that war is all wrawng and why cahunt everyone in Yurrupe live peaceably same as us; that Religion don't count same as it useter 'cos there's more enlight'nment now." So he could perceive, and denounce, lunatic world-saving Wilsonian optimism when it fell from his hosts' lips. Why that optimism somehow became acceptable when the increase in "enlight'nment" had been effected by the guillotine, instead of by American presidential overreach, Belloc never explained.

This all amounts to a grim indictment. What case for the defense can outweigh it? There actually exist two such cases: first, Belloc's daunting percipience; second, his equally daunting versatility as a poet.

Given Belloc's prophetic skill, it comes as a severe jolt to recollect that he was born back in 1870. (He died in 1953; but a stroke robbed him of his authorial powers in 1942.) Almost every major political trend of the last hundred years—whether the Third Reich, or the bipartisan welfarism familiar from our own experience, or the socialization of agriculture, or incessant Middle East massacres, or the spirit of *jihad*, or the willful confusion between legitimate private enterprise and piratical paper-shuffling, or the sexual revolution, or mad-scientist genetic technology—Belloc predicted. His output retains an immediacy for our time that is impossible to discern in most of his journalistic confreres. At a time when H.G. Wells, John Dewey, and Bertrand Russell counted as forward-looking thinkers—while notching up an almost 100 percent failure rate when it came to even the least contentious prophesying about global trends five weeks, let alone five years, down the track—Belloc plodded on, fortified by nothing more glamorous than preternatural energy and a worldview too European and synoptic to countenance the least parochialism. Plodding of that type seldom facilitates benignity, genial tolerance towards opponents, or leisurely musings on the joys of artistic creation. Nor does life in the House of Commons, where Belloc sat for four dispiriting years (1906-1910) as a maverick Liberal parliamentarian.

Little wonder that Belloc at times bullied when he should have insinuated, at times cut corners on fine detail when he should have checked and rechecked a specific datum. His antagonists went to town when they caught him crediting the early-seventeenth-century Spanish poet Francisco de Quevedo with having influenced France's Joachin du Bellay, who perished two decades before Quevedo was born, or citing a monastic chronicler dead since 1259 as an author-

ity on conflicts occurring in 1265. They would have benefited from devoting equal attention to this passage, the closest approach Belloc ever made to explicating his historiographical outlook:

[Coulton] does not appreciate the weight of a whole stream of tradition, supported by a parallel stream of documentary evidence. If these combined make for a certain conclusion which no rational man can doubt, he would think it sufficient to bring out against it one isolated exception. Many generations hence there will be a broad stream of tradition and document to show that Englishmen in the nineteenth century did not eat human flesh, but I am sure that if Dr. Coulton were on the other side he would triumphantly quote the shipwrecked mariners of the *Mignonette* and continue to say that the Victorians were cannibals.

Where on occasion Belloc grew careless in small (although still important) matters, his mixture of erudition and depressive realism made him authoritative in large ones. True, he overestimated Russia's liberal imagination to the disastrous extent of buying Krensky Government bonds. Yet his comprehension of Bolshevism, when that plague-germ started on its pandemic course, surpassed not only anything Wells or Beatrice Webb or Bernard Shaw revealed—not that outsmarting those sages on the Soviet issue required notable effort—but much official scholarship as well. Naïfs might well have spent the Cold War unable to grasp how every Kremlin boss from Lenin to Gorbachev enjoyed the shameless backing of Armand Hammer and allied plutocrats on Wall Street. At such an outcome Belloc felt no surprise whatever. Spain's civil war merely confirmed him in his realization that the capitalist and the

communist alike have always hated any Catholic society far more than they have ever hated each other. Thanks partly to Cardinal Manning's pronouncements, and to Pope Leo XIII's *Rerum Novarum* encyclical, Belloc had learned this simple truth by 1902. It continues to elude the typical Republican Party *apparatchik* in 2002.

Because neither on this topic nor on any other did mealy-mouthedness come naturally, or at all, to Belloc, a veritable heavy industry has arisen for the specific purpose of forever associating his name with Nazi racist hatred. Mere facts like Belloc's loud and clear condemnations of Hitler from 1933 onwards—and of wider Teutonic militarism from, it often seems, the very day he learned to talk—have achieved little momentum against this industry, which has ensured that millions who have never read a line he wrote consider it as natural to link the words "Belloc" and "anti-Semitism" as to link "Gilbert" with "Sullivan" or "Abbott" with "Costello." (Sometimes his aversion to Nazism led him into anti-Pius-XII rhetoric little different from John Cornwell's and Daniel Jonah Goldhagen's diatribes nowadays. "The Pope continues to be mum," he lamented in 1940, "and to confine himself to generalities. He is to be blamed.") A good answer to myths of Belloc's Jew-baiting is the 1922 book, which he actually called *The Jews*, and which Pearce rightly deems "an exercise in carefully considered and controlled restraint." Here Belloc overtly reprehends Jew-baiters' driving obsession: "The Anti-Semite will confuse the action of any particular Jew with his general odium for the race . . . [he is] so absorbed in his subject that he at last loses interest in any matter, unless he can give it some association with his delusion, for delusion it is."

Worse still, *The Jews* maintains, is the glutinous progressive doublethink that

lets Anglophone Gentiles imagine in 1922—and long afterwards—that Central and Eastern Europe would overnight become as easily governable as New England or New Zealand, if only their peoples could be administered an adequately stiff dose of pagan *laissez-faire*. Belloc's pan-European credo—"The Faith is Europe," he observed, "and Europe is the Faith"—sharpened his awareness of the emotional allure, that nationalism possessed for other minds more flaccid and less educated than his own. Far from advocating anything like the Final Solution, *The Jews*, if properly pondered by Europe's leaders, would probably have done more than any other English-language book to prevent the Final Solution. Its Chapters XI and XV also foresaw (a generation before the world had heard of Irgun) the price that Zionism would extract in Jewish blood.

Just as *The Jews* and its sequel *The Battleground* (1936) can illustrate far more about the Middle East's current anguish than the collected works of Dick Cheney, so a better-known and wider-ranging production of Belloc's, *Survivals and New Arrivals* (1929), furnishes—in its scrutiny of militant Islam—a far better guide to what makes Osama run than any State Department verbiage. Even some of the pamphlets Belloc churned out to propitiate his children's alleged "howl[ing] for pearls and caviar" contain more useful information than many a lesser scribe's life work. *The Free Press* (1918) can teach us much more of the Rupert Murdoch mentality's fundamentally nihilistic spite than is obtainable from any journalism degree course. And this is to leave out the travel books: particularly *The Path to Rome* and *The Cruise of the "Nona,"* whence epigrams stay in the mind long after the more conventional scene-painting fades from memory.

It would nevertheless be a bold reader who actually preferred such books to Belloc's collected poems. Though Belloc has been dead for half a century, the charm, tang, and inspired mischief of his children's verse—*Cautionary Tales*, *The Bad Child's Book of Beasts*, *More Peers*, and the rest—remain as addictive to many a primary-school child in our own era as they were to us, and to our parents, and to their parents. Yet only the ill-informed would assume that those volumes constitute Belloc's main, let alone his sole, poetical achievement. His muse's many-sidedness is hair-raising. The finest tributes he lavished on his (platonically) adored friend Lady Diana Cooper display, even at the lowest possible reckoning, an exceptional aptitude for Elizabethan pastiche:

That I grow sour, who only lack
delight;
That I descend to sneer, who only
grieve;
That from my depth I should
condemn your height,
That with my blame my mockery
you receive—
Huntress and splendor of the
woodland night—
Diana of this world, do not
believe.

Elsewhere he evokes seventeenth- rather than sixteenth-century idioms, as in "Ballade to Our Lady of Czestochowa", which could almost be by one of the Metaphysical Poets:

Lady and Queen and Mystery
manifold
And very Regent of the untroubled
sky,
Whom in a dream St. Hilda did
behold
And heard a woodland music
passing by:

You shall receive me when the
clouds are high
With evening and the sheep attain
the fold . . .
Prince of the degradations, bought
and sold,
These verses, written in your
crumbling sty,
Proclaim the faith that I have held
and hold
And publish that in which I mean
to die.

Often he matches A.E. Housman's freakish gift for achieving permanent and dignified memorability while using precious few words of more than one syllable. Who can happily contemplate life in the average nursing home after reading Belloc's description—which, in its lucid pathos, even Housman might have envied—of decrepitude?

*You find that middle life goes
rushing past.
You find despair; and at the
very last
You find, as you are giving up
the ghost,
That those who loved you best
despise you most.*

Evelyn Waugh noted the Housman resemblance in 1954: "He [Belloc] was a Christian Shropshire Lad and, by that enrichment, immeasurably Housman's superior."

Did Belloc fail? In terms of personal wealth, of stemming history's tide, he failed miserably. But perhaps a stray phrase from Ezra Pound's *Cantos* best sums Belloc up: "a failure worth all the successes of his age." ■

R. J. Stove lives in Melbourne, Australia and contributes regularly to Chronicles and the New Criterion. He is the author of The Unsleeping Eye: A Brief History of Secret Police and Their Victims.

[howdy, comrade]

NATO's Left Turn

"Former" Communists thrive in the new NATO.

By John Laughland

THE HIGH POINT of last November's NATO summit in Prague came when a couple of aging rock stars wearing sunglasses and black leather staggered onto a stage and sang John Lennon's "Power to the People!" to the assembled summiteers. Earlier in the evening, the suits had watched an avant-garde ballet, in which films were projected at high speed of dancers in their underwear miming copulation on an enormous bed. If any proof were needed that the Cold War has been won by the Left, such in-your-face postmodern trash was it: as one British NATO cheerleader wrote, "In Prague, NATO became a peace movement."

The cultural program for the Prague summit was a typical choice by the Czech president, Václav Havel. An icon of the 1960s, Havel is known as an advocate of free love, world peace, and the end of the nation-state. It is also rumoured that he dabbles in New Age and the occult.

Whatever the truth, the key point about this gigantic jamboree—2,000 delegates, 3,000 journalists, 14,000 police and troops to protect them, and 200,000 Praguers who fled their homes for the week—was that the West extended a warm embrace to some of the most senior henchmen of the Communist tyranny, and thereby proclaimed the Cold War over.

The leaders of the new NATO member states include a former Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic; a former General Secretary of the communist Youth in Romania at the height of that country's bloodiest Stalinism; a senior communist *apparatchik* from Czechoslovakia, whose career blossomed for 20 years after the crushing of the Prague spring and who ended up as a member of the Central Committee; a minister in the very last Communist government of Poland; and a former agent of the Hungarian KGB. They were joined in Prague by the various Oriental despots and thugs who continue to run the former Soviet Central Asian and Caucasian republics, as they did during the Soviet Union, and who have signed various association agreements with the Atlantic alliance.

The West did this because its own ideology is viscerally hostile to anti-communists. The warm welcome extended to Peter Medgyessy, the new prime minister of Hungary who was rumbled as a communist secret agent shortly after his election in the summer, contrasts vividly with the distaste Washington barely hides for his predecessor, Viktor Orbán. That young man, who rose to prominence as a vehement anti-communist at the end of the 1980s, is now dismissed as a "nationalist" in Beltway circles and

is repeatedly accused of "having tolerated anti-Semitism." By the same token, U.S. government agencies intervened illegally in September's elections in Slovakia to do down the conservative Vladimir Meciar, the most popular politician in Slovakia.

One by one, indeed, the West has systematically worked to undermine or eliminate anti-communists: Franjo Tudjman in Croatia, Sali Berisha in Albania, Alexander Luka-shenko in Belarus ... the list goes all the way back to the early 1990s, when the West helped topple the anti-Soviet Georgian president, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, preferring instead the long-serving First Secretary of the Communist Party in Soviet Georgia, Edward Shevardnadze.

As Havel's rock concert showed, the victor in the Cold War was therefore not anti-communism, but "reform." I will never forget attending a meeting of bearded Romanian and Hungarian "dissidents" in the mountains of Transylvania in the summer of 1990, shortly after the "fall of communism": they all remained convinced Marxists. Their goal, and that of their colleagues across the Eastern bloc, had never been to destroy Marxism, but to reform it by encouraging a "convergence" between East and West.

This ultimately Gnostic dream of a world with no divisions was the political creed of all tolerated dissidents from Sakharov to Havel; serious anti-communists like Solzhenitsyn and Zinoviev, in contrast, are no friends of the new world order.

For what the New Left really hated about the communist system was its conservatism. Encouraged by the ideology of the 1960s, the younger generation of Marxists resented the social prudery and patriotism of the post-Stalinist ruling class. The anti-Zionism of the USSR and its allies, which increased after the Six-Day War, also made many

communists feel uncomfortable. Consequently, these people reinvigorated the dormant opposition that Trotsky had articulated against Stalin's "socialism in one country": they wanted world revolution. They knew, as Marx and Engels had taught in *The Communist Manifesto*, that the best way of achieving this was through "the bourgeois revolution," i.e., global capitalism, which the New Left liked for its perceived moral nihilism and its terrible revolutionary force.

Like Marx, the New Left understood that global capitalism would destroy all traditional social structures, especially the family and the nation. Just as Marx idolized the worker "who has no country," so Marxists had no difficulty identifying with the internationalist ideals of the new world order. Above all, they recognised that the key Marxist-Leninist goal of the withering away of the state could never be achieved unless the old communist structures were jettisoned in favour of the Western cosmopolitan ideology of global markets and administrative rule by ostensibly apolitical supranational organizations like the UN, the EU, NATO, the IMF, and the WTO.

Consequently, the eminently communist ideology of anti-fascism has become the West's principal—perhaps only—political value. It is press-ganged into service whenever a state shows any sign of resisting the new world order ideal of statelessness, all of whose enemies are tarred as "right-wing," "fascist," or "the new Hitler," even when they are in fact from the Old Left, like Slobodan Milosevic or Saddam Hussein. One of Havel's advisers even attacked the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia as "extreme Right."

Just as, under communism, the ideology of statelessness is conjugated with a massive increase in the reality of state power, so anti-fascism is used to justify ever greater restrictions on individual

liberty: the first anti-fascist protection barrier, after all, was the Berlin Wall.

These trends are set to increase in the future. In the November/December issue of *Foreign Affairs*, Celeste Wallander of the Center for Strategic and International Studies calls for the imposition of supranational political control by NATO on its own member states. The values she seeks to protect are not the bare essentials of military necessity, but the limitless requirements of political correctness: she cites, as evidence of the good NATO has already done, that Hungary got rid of its "nationalist" government and that Lithuania has "acknowledged its anti-Semitic past and role in the Holocaust." Given that such nonsense is U.S. State Department standard issue, there no reason why Wallander's suggestion that a state should be expelled if its government is "xenophobic, authoritarian or corrupt" should not become official NATO policy.

Marx and Engels never intended Orthodox, backward Russia to be the bearer of the world revolution. They looked instead to the most technologically advanced states of their day, Germany and Britain.

So it is with the U.S. now, which today's market-Leninists see as but a means to an end, and as an instrument to be jettisoned once the goal is achieved. Even if the good sense of the American people prevails, therefore, and the U.S. one day pulls back from its current globalist adventure, the interlude will have done its evil work: if ever the current imperialist tide recedes to Washington, it will leave in place, all over the world, the filthy deposit of real revolution. ■

John Laughland is a writer and lecturer based in London and a trustee of the British Helsinki Human Rights Group.

Cousin Marriage Conundrum

An ancient Iraqi custom will foil nation-building.

By Steve Sailer

MANY PROMINENT neoconservatives are calling on America not only to conquer Iraq (and perhaps more Muslim nations after that), but also to rebuild Iraqi society in order to jumpstart the democratization of the Middle East. Yet, Americans know so little about the Middle East that few of us are even aware of one of the building blocks of Arab Muslim cultures: cousin marriage. Not surprisingly, we are almost utterly innocent of how much the high degree of inbreeding in Iraq could interfere with our nation-building ambitions.

In Iraq, as in much of the region, nearly half of all married couples are first or second cousins. A 1986 study of 4,500 married hospital patients and staff in Baghdad found that 46 percent were wed to a first or second cousin, while a smaller 1989 survey found 53 percent were "consanguineously" married. The most prominent example of an Iraqi first cousin marriage is that of Saddam Hussein and his first wife Sajida.

By fostering intense family loyalties and strong nepotistic urges, inbreeding makes the development of civil society more difficult. Many Americans have heard by now that Iraq is composed of three ethnic groups—the Kurds of the north, the Sunnis of the center, and the Shi'ites of the south. Clearly, these ethnic rivalries would complicate the task of reforming Iraq. But that is just a top-down summary of Iraq's ethnic make-up. Each of those three ethnic groups is divisible into smaller and smaller tribes, clans, and inbred extended families—each with its

own alliances, rivals, and feuds. And the engine at the bottom of these bedeviling social divisions is the oft-ignored institution of cousin marriage.

The fractiousness and tribalism of Middle Eastern countries have frequently been remarked. In 1931, King Feisal of Iraq described his subjects as "devoid of any patriotic idea, ... connected by no common tie, giving ear to evil; prone to anarchy, and perpetually ready to rise against any government whatever." The clannishness, corruption, and coups frequently observed in countries such as Iraq appear to be tied to the high rates of inbreeding.

Muslim countries are usually known for warm, devoted extended family relationships but also for weak patriotism. In the U.S., where individualism is so strong, many assume that "family values" and civic virtues such as sacrificing for the good of society always go together. But, in Islamic countries, family loyalty is often at war with national loyalty. Civic virtues, military effectiveness, and economic performance all suffer.

Commentator Randall Parker wrote, "Consanguinity [cousin marriage] is the biggest underappreciated factor in Western analyses of Middle Eastern politics. Most Western political theorists seem blind to the importance of pre-ideological kinship-based political bonds in large part because those bonds are not derived from abstract Western ideological models of how societies and political systems should be organized. ... Extended families that are incredibly tightly bound are

really the enemy of civil society because the alliances of family override any consideration of fairness to people in the larger society. Yet, this obvious fact is missing from 99 percent of the discussions about what is wrong with the Middle East. How can we transform Iraq into a modern liberal democracy if every government worker sees a government job as a route to helping out his clan at the expense of other clans?"

U.S. Army Col. Norvell De Atkine (Ret.) spent years trying to train America's Arab allies in modern combat techniques. In an article in *American Diplomacy* titled, "Why Arabs Lose Wars," a frustrated De Atkine explained, "First, the well-known lack of trust among Arabs for anyone outside their own family adversely affects offensive operations ... In a culture in which almost every sphere of human endeavor, including business and social relationships, is based on a family structure, this orientation is also present in the military, particularly in the stress of battle. 'Offensive action, basically, consists of fire and maneuver,' De Atkine continued. 'The maneuver element must be confident that supporting units or arms are providing covering fire. If there is a lack of trust in that support, getting troops moving forward against dug-in defenders is possible only by officers getting out front and leading, something that has not been a characteristic of Arab leadership.'

Similarly, as Francis Fukuyama described in his 1995 book, *Trust: The Social Virtues & the Creation of Prosperity*, countries such as Italy with highly loyal extended families can generate dynamic family firms. Yet, their larger corporations tend to be rife with goldbricking, corruption, and nepotism, all because their employees do not trust

each other to show their highest loyalty to the firm rather than their own extended families. Arab cultures are more family-focused even than Sicily, and therefore their larger economic enterprises suffer even more.

American society is so biased against inbreeding that many Americans have a hard time even conceiving of marrying a cousin. Yet, arranged matches between first cousins (especially between the children of brothers) are considered the ideal throughout much of a broad expanse from North Africa through West Asia and into Pakistan and India.

Americans have long dismissed cousin marriage as something practiced only among hillbillies. That old stereotype of inbred mountaineers waging decades-long blood feuds had some truth to it. One study of 107 marriages in Beech Creek, Kentucky in 1942 found 19 percent were consanguineous, although the Kentuckians were more inclined toward second-cousin marriages, while first-cousin couples are more common than second-cousin pairings in the Islamic lands.

Cousin marriage averages not much more than one percent in most European countries and under 10 percent in the rest of the world outside that Morocco to Southern India corridor. Muslim immigration, however, has been boosting Europe's low level of consanguinity. According to the leading authority on inbreeding, geneticist Alan H. Bittles of Edith Cowan University in Perth, Australia, "In the resident Pakistani community of some 0.5 million [in Britain] an estimated 50% to 60+% of marriages are consanguineous, with evidence that their prevalence is increasing."

European nations have recently become increasingly hostile toward the common practice among their Muslim immigrants of arranging marriages between their children and citizens of their home country, frequently their relatives. One study of Turkish guest-work-

ers in the Danish city of Ishøj found that 98 percent—1st, 2nd, and 3rd generation—married a spouse from Turkey who then came and lived in Denmark. (Turks, however, are quite a bit less enthusiastic about cousin marriage than are Arabs or Pakistanis, which correlates with the much stronger degree of patriotism found in Turkey.)

European "family reunification" laws present an immigrant with the opportunity to bring in his nephew by marrying his daughter to him. Not surprisingly, "family reunification" almost always works just in one direction—with the new husband moving from the poor Muslim country to the rich European country. If a European-born daughter refused to marry her cousin from the old country just because she does not love him, that would deprive her extended family of the boon of an immigration visa. So, intense family pressure can fall on the daughter to do as she is told. The new Danish right-wing government has introduced legislation to crack down on these kind of marriages

riages. It also strengthened broader institutions like the Church and the nation-state.

Islam itself may not be responsible for the high rates of inbreeding in Muslim countries. (Similarly high levels of consanguinity are found among Hindus in Southern India, although there uncle-niece marriages are socially preferred, even though their degree of genetic similarity is twice that of cousin marriages, with worse health consequences for offspring.) Rafat Hussain, a Pakistani-born Senior Lecturer at the University of New England in Australia, told me, "Islam does not specifically encourage cousin marriages and, in fact, in the early days of the spread of Islam, marriages outside the clan were highly desirable to increase cultural and religious influence." She adds, "The practice has little to do with Islam (or in fact any religion) and has been a prevalent cultural norm before Islam." Inbreeding (or "endogamy") is also common among Christians in the Middle East, although less so than among Muslims.

UNLIKE THE MIDDLE EAST, EUROPE UNDERWENT WHAT SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON CALLS THE "ROMEO AND JULIET REVOLUTION."

arranged to generate visas. British Home Secretary David Blunkett has called for immigrants to arrange more marriages within Britain.

Unlike the Middle East, Europe underwent what Samuel P. Huntington calls the "Romeo and Juliet revolution." Europeans became increasingly sympathetic toward the right of a young woman to marry the man she loves. Setting the stage for this was the Catholic Church's long war against cousin marriage, even out to fourth cousins or higher. This weakened the extended family in Europe, thus lessening the advantages of arranged mar-

The Muslim practice is similar to older Middle Eastern norms, such as those outlined in Leviticus in the Old Testament. The lineage of the Hebrew Patriarchs who founded the Jewish people was highly inbred. Isaac married Rebekah, a cousin once removed. And Isaac's son Jacob wed his two first cousins, Leah and Rachel. Jacob's dozen sons were the famous progenitors of the Twelve Tribes of Israel. Due to inbreeding, Jacob's eight legitimate sons had only six unique great-grandparents instead of the usual eight. That is because the inbred are related to their relatives through multiple paths.

Why do so many people around the world prefer to keep marriage in the family? Rafat Hussain noted, "In patriarchal societies where parents exert considerable influence and gender segregation is followed more strictly, marriage choice is limited to whom you know. While there is some pride in staying within the inner bounds of family for social or economic reasons, the more important issue is: Where will parents find a good match? Often, it boils down to whom you know and can trust."

Another important motivation—one that is particularly important in many herding cultures, such as the ancient ones from which the Jews and Muslims emerged—is to prevent inheritable wealth from being split among too many descendants. This can be especially important when there are economies of scale in the family business.

Just as the inbred have fewer unique ancestors than the outbred, they also have fewer unique heirs, helping keep both the inheritance and the brothers together. When a herd-owning patriarch marries his son off to his younger brother's daughter, he insures that his grandson and his grandnephew will be the same person. Likewise, the younger brother benefits from knowing that his grandson will also be the patriarch's grandson and heir. Thus, by making sibling rivalry over inheritance less relevant, cousin marriage emotionally unites families. The anthropologist Carleton Coon also pointed out that by minimizing the number of relatives a Bedouin Arab nomad has, this system of inbreeding "does not overextend the number of persons whose deaths an honorable man must avenge."

Of course, there are also disadvantages to inbreeding. The best known is medical. Being inbred increases the chance of inheriting genetic syndromes caused by malignant recessive genes. Bitles found that, after controlling for

socio-economic factors, the babies of first cousins had about a 30 percent higher chance of dying before their first birthdays. The biggest disadvantage, however, may be political.

Are Muslims, especially Arabs, so much more loyal to their families than to their nations because, due to countless generations of cousin marriages, they are so much more genealogically related to their families than Westerners are related to theirs? Frank Salter, a political scientist at the Max Planck Institute in Germany, whose new book *Risky Transactions: Trust, Kinship, and Ethnicity* takes a sociobiological look at the reason why Mafia families are indeed families, told me, "That's my hunch; at least it's bound to be a factor."

One of the basic laws of modern biology, quantified by William D. Hamilton in 1964 under the name "kin selection," is that the closer the genetic relationship between two people, the more likely they are to feel loyalty and altruism toward each other. Natural selection has molded us not just to try to propagate our own genes, but to help our relatives, who possess copies of some of our specific genes, to propagate their own.

Nepotism is thus biologically inspired. Hamilton explained that the level of nepotistic feeling generally depends upon the degree of genetic similarity. You share half your personally variable genes with your children and siblings, but one quarter with your nephews/nieces and grandchildren, so your nepotistic urges will tend to be somewhat less toward them. You share one eighth of your genes with your first cousins, and one thirty-second with your second cousin, so your feelings of family loyalty tend to fall off quickly. But not as quickly if you and your relatives are inbred. Then, you will be related to your kin via multiple pathways. You will all be genetically more similar, so your normal family feelings will be multi-

plied. For example, because your son-in-law might be also be the nephew you have cherished since his childhood, you can lavish all the nepotistic altruism on him that in outbred Western societies would be split between your son-in-law and your nephew.

Unfortunately, as nepotism is usually a zero-sum game, the flip side of being materially nicer toward your relatives would be that you would have fewer resources left with which to be civil, or even just fair, toward non-kin. So nepotistic corruption is rampant in countries such as Iraq, where Saddam has appointed members of his extended family from his hometown of Tikrit to many key positions in the national government.

Similarly, a tendency toward inbreeding can turn an extended family into a miniature racial group with its own partially isolated gene pool. (Dog breeders use extreme forms of inbreeding to create new breeds in a handful of generations.) The ancient Hebrews provide a vivid example of a partly inbred extended family (that of Abraham and his posterity) that evolved into its own ethnic group. This process has been going on for thousands of years in the Middle East, which is why not just the Jews, but also why tiny, ancient inbreeding groups such as the Samaritans and the John-the-Baptist-worshipping Sabaeans still survive.

In summary, although neoconservatives constantly point to America's success at reforming Germany and Japan after World War II as evidence that it would be easy to do the same in the Middle East, the deep social structure of Iraq is the complete opposite of those two true nation-states, with their highly patriotic, co-operative, and (not surprisingly) outbred peoples. The Iraqis, in contrast, more closely resemble the Hatfields and the McCoy's. ■

Steve Sailer (www.iSteve.com) is a columnist for VDARE.com.

[beware of virtual reality]

Rage Against the Machine

A modern-day Luddite argues that computers deaden our souls.

By William S. Lind

RUSSELL KIRK, WHO may have been the only conservative in the post-war American conservative movement, forbade the importation of television sets into his ancestral manse, Piety Hill. One day, in his absence, his wife and daughters smuggled one in. Dr. Kirk discovered it, and they in turn soon discovered him, high in the tower with television in hand, pitching it off the roof.

Television, like all virtual realities, comes from Hell. (The author of this piece, having hosted several television programs, knows how difficult it is to use the medium for good; in effect, one has to do bad television.) Earlier generations of conservatives knew instinctively that machines could be Hellish, and they regarded innovative technologies with distrust.

It is perhaps a measure of how much conservatism has withered away that most American conservatives now welcome any new technology that comes along. They love cell phones, which destroy what little is left of the public space. They gush over genetic engineering, which will create weapons that bring back the Black Death. Most of all, they embrace computers and all their progeny even though, all around us, our fellow subjects of Heaven are using them to create virtual realities they can inhabit almost full-time. (Fortunately, they still have to eat.)

The first Christian principle, and the first principle of Western civilization, is that there is and can be only one reality. If there can be multiple realities, we lose both Jerusalem and Athens. If there can be more than one reality, there can be more than one God; so falls Jerusalem and monotheism. If there can be more than one reality, what is logical in one means nothing in others, where logic itself may not hold; so falls Athens and reason. All things are indeed relative where realities proliferate.

Hell has always hated reality, for in the real world, Christ is King. Old Screwtape's problem, for millennia, was that philosophy made a poor weapon against reality. Even Hell's most sophisticated philosophical device, ideology, fell sure prey to reality, seldom lasting more than a couple of generations. His Wormship knew that he needed a more powerful and enduring weapon than philosophy could provide. He needed convincing but false images of the true: virtual realities.

Virtual realities existed, to be sure. Nero's *Domus Aurea* was one; Marie Antoinette's life as a shepherdess another. Military headquarters were often wonderful generators of virtual reality. (We now flood ours with computers, making the problem worse.) But these took great power and vast resources to create and were also

impossible to sustain.

If Hell were to triumph over reality and make it stick—which comes very close to triumphing over God—it needed to find a mechanism that could create powerful, compelling virtual realities, proliferate them widely, and enable people to live in them, self-convincingly, most of the time. And then, brilliantly, Hell's workshops begat the cathode ray tube and the video screen.

It is clear that many modern people live lives where the video screen, in all its many variants, is the dominating reality. (Perhaps we should borrow here from Derrida and write *reality*.) Televisions are on and squawking throughout the house, from rising through going to bed. The children spend countless hours with their video games; sunny days are irrelevant. The adults' version is the Internet, whose most common use is for pornography. All offer alternate realities, an ever growing variety of them, all getting better and better in their ability to seem real. First they are alluring, then satisfying, and finally compulsive. Snap! Go the jaws of Hell.

If most conservatives were still conservative, they would find this troubling. Some do find the content of many virtual realities discomfiting; the Roman arena begins to pale in comparison. But few seem to see that the Reality Principle (Marcuse's old enemy) is itself at

stake. Is watching a Mass on television the same as going to Mass? No. Is knowing that it is a fine day in Ouagadougou the same as enjoying a fine day in the park? Again, no. Is watching people on a video screen the same as knowing actual people? No, indeed. But in more and more lives, the virtual is replacing the real.

And the image is substituting itself for the Word, the Logos. The West spent three thousand years struggling to substitute the Word for the image. The war of the Word against the image is perhaps the most basic theme of the Old Testament. Thousands of Christians gave their lives in that fight. Now, thanks to the video screen, history is running backwards because on video screens images are far more powerful than words. Not surprisingly, paganism is on the rise, beyond and within the Church.

If conservatives cannot see the danger in the thing itself, in the substitution of the false for the true, one would expect they would at least, be alarmed that all virtual realities are subject to

manipulation. Today, in America, most of them are manipulated, deliberately and systematically, to serve the ideology of cultural Marxism, a.k.a. political correctness. Thus we get endless television programs and video games where men are puny and women

Hitler." Does the prospect of Brave New World not bother conservatives anymore?

The answer to all the above, from many technology-addicted conservatives, is that computers and their ilk provide wonderful sources of information.

WHEN LIFE IS, IN EFFECT, AN ENDLESS PROCESS OF INTERRUPTION, THOUGHT, AS WE TRADITIONALLY KNEW IT, BECOMES IMPOSSIBLE.

strong (they beat up the men), muggers are white and doctors are black, and the only normal-seeming white males are homosexuals. Thanks to virtual realities, the entertainment industry has become the most powerful force in American culture, and it is largely owned by the cultural Marxists. Through it, cultural Marxism does what it is supposed to do, psychologically condition. Soon enough, in any life where virtual realities hold sway, anyone who dares think that maybe Western civilization really is superior looks in the mirror and sees "another

That is undoubtedly true. But it raises a further, very conservative, question: is information itself all that wonderful?

I often lecture to young people, college grads, usually on military topics. They are adept at the information technologies, having imbibed them as their mother's milk. The problem, to put it bluntly, is that most of them cannot think. They cannot think because of information, not because of a lack of it.

An Amish friend of mine, David Klein, put it well as we talked under the trees of his Wayne County, Ohio, farmyard this past summer. Using information technologies, he said, is like trying to build a car by reaching blindly into a vast dumpster and using as parts whatever comes to hand. That is how these young minds work. They cannot grasp any sort of intellectual order or framework. All they have ever encountered are bits and pieces of this and that, spewed randomly out of some cosmic, universal vending machine. It is not simply that things do not make sense; these young people have no concept of things making sense. As Ortega warned would happen, they have become technologically competent barbarians.

Again, an earlier generation of conservatives would have understood. When life is, in effect, an endless process of interruption, thought, as we traditionally knew it, becomes impossible. Western thought is linear, but "infor-



mation" is chaotic. More, thought requires being alone with your thoughts, something the technologically dependent can neither attain nor abide.

Just as intellectual chaos is normal to the information generation, so is their lowly status as humble servants to lumps of beige plastic. I will confess that a year ago, I was browbeaten by my office into putting a fax machine in my summer home in Ohio. It was more demanding than a cat. Unless I met its every beeped and coded wish, and they were many, it refused to work. (Even a neglected cat will still catch mice.) This summer, I realized I was the servant and it the master and resolved this inversion of the natural order in Kirkian fashion, by taking a sledgehammer to it. Its human replacement, a FedEx courier, does the same job with far less trouble.

But rebellion of this sort lies far outside the ken of those who worship the computer and its siblings. They cannot imagine lives without their machines, even though we lived such lives (quite nicely, too) just a few decades ago. No sabot in the gears for them; without their calculators, they cannot even add. Go to the bank some fine day and ask the young teller to do something that "isn't in the computer," and she will look at you with great, cow eyes.

Conservatives used to know that information does not equal knowledge and that knowledge does not equal understanding. (T.S. Eliot had something to say on the matter.) The transitions require thought, and computers, in both their informational and virtual reality guises, are enemies of thought. Thought only works if it is unplugged. ■

In addition to writing on military topics, William S. Lind serves as the Director of the Center for Cultural Conservatism of the Free Congress Foundation. His e-mail address is Western Union.

Arming Our Rival

America's drive to tap the Chinese market fortifies a potential enemy. **By William R. Hawkins**

THE END OF THE Cold War seemingly liberated business from geopolitical constraints. The "global factory" dissociated industrial complexes from their former national homes and scattered facilities across the planet in the pursuit of low-cost labor and efficient subcontractors. Many small states from the Caribbean to the Pacific Rim benefited from this process. But now that process may be turning full circle, as China's vast resources give it a competitive advantage. With wage rates less than half of Mexico's and a government dedicated to making China the dominant power in Asia, new industrial centers are being built that will re-integrate technology and production in a setting with major geopolitical consequences.

China is now the world's fourth-largest industrial producer behind the U.S., Japan, and Germany. Nearly half of all the goods China exports are made by foreign companies that have built factories in China. Foreign investment continues to soar and is on pace to hit a record \$50 billion this year. China's hi-tech exports to the U.S. are now growing faster than any other export category, up 47 percent in the first seven months of 2002 compared to the same period in 2001.

Intel has announced a \$100 million investment in Shanghai to assemble Pentium 4 microprocessors, Dell has moved its giant PC-making facility from Kuala Lumpur to Xiamen. Motorola plans to spend an additional \$1 billion on R&D, hire 4,000 more engineers, and increase annual Chinese production to \$10 billion by 2006. Microsoft has an-

nounced it will invest \$750 million in China over the next three years. It currently supports software colleges at over 35 universities to train future generations of Chinese innovators.

Honeywell Aerospace claims it provides extensive training for the "best engineers" working for Aviation Industries of China (AVIC), including bringing them to U.S. plants to learn about American technology firsthand. AVIC is under the direct control of the government and is responsible for developing and manufacturing both military and civil aircraft, missiles, and jet engines. It also has extensive research capabilities in aerodynamics, materials, and manufacturing technology at the heart of Beijing's military-industrial complex.

China is no longer just a place to make sneakers and toys. Indeed, thanks to aid American firms gave to the development of China's satellite launchers, Beijing now plans a manned space program next year, which could provide a Sputnik-scale wake-up call.

China stands poised to become the production center of the world, a development that would weaken Beijing's economic rivals in Asia, many of whom are political and military allies of the United States.

Beijing never accepted the post-Cold-War view of an harmonious world where the location of strategic industries has no political consequences. A U.S. General Accounting Office report released in April of this year found,

China has made improving its semiconductor manufacturing capability a priority for national

and economic security reasons and plans to build as many as 20 multibillion-dollar manufacturing facilities over the next 5 to 10 years with substantial levels of foreign investment.

The report continued, "China's efforts to improve its semiconductor manufacturing capability have narrowed the gap between U.S. and Chinese semiconductor manufacturing technology from between 7 to 10 years to 2 years or less" and that this rapid progress "has improved its ability to develop more capable weapons systems and advanced consumer electronics."

Last summer, the U.S.-China Security Review Commission released its first annual report on the implications of American aid to Chinese economic development. The Commission was created by Congress, its twelve members appointed by the leaders of both parties. Its report found, "Chinese leaders consistently characterize the United States as a 'hegemon,' connoting a powerful protagonist and overbearing bully that is China's major rival, but they also believe that the United States is a declining power with important military vulnerabilities that can be exploited." In short, America's days as world leader are numbered, and China's emergence will bring about the final countdown.

China's military modernization is aimed at defeating the U.S., especially in any battle over control of Taiwan. Beijing is also a major source of technology proliferation, helping put weapons in the hands of rogue states and terrorist groups, including the Taliban. The Commission explains China's motives: "Beijing's relationships with terrorist-sponsoring regimes provides China with leverage against the U.S., enhance China's political and military influence, and provide the PRC with foreign exchange and access to energy sources."

The Commission believes that China's

ties to terrorist states have continued despite the Sept. 11 attacks on the United States. One way Beijing prevents radical Muslims from aiding their brethren in China is by supporting their efforts against the West.

The Commission's conclusions about China's antagonistic policies would be disturbing enough, but the largest part of its report concerns the ways American corporations are helping China obtain the means to carry out its ambitions. The Commission found:

- The U.S. has been a major contributor, through trade and investment, to China's rise as an economic power.
- The burgeoning trade deficit with China will worsen despite China's entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO).
- The large number of Chinese students, scholars, and researchers present in the U.S. academic and industrial establishment is a principal means used by China to acquire American science and technology.
- China's manufacturing capability in advanced technology products (ATP) has expanded dramatically; and the U.S. now runs a trade deficit with China in a majority of the items on the ATP list compiled by the Commerce Department.
- Over the next 10 years China will acquire a modernized industrial capacity to build advanced conventional and strategic weapons.
- The U.S. is developing a reliance on Chinese imports that could in time undermine our defense industrial base.

Though Beijing seems vulnerable because it depends so much on exports to the American market, Chinese strategists still draw on communist theory in their analysis. They do not see the United States as a democracy but as a

plutocracy run by and for major corporations. They do not believe the "big capitalists" will allow the U.S. government to interfere with anything Beijing does for fear of losing their investments in China and their supply of Chinese-made products.

The political activity of major business firms and corporate-funded think tanks encourages Chinese leaders in this belief. James A. Dorn of the libertarian Cato Institute denounced the U.S.-China Security Review Commission in an Oct. 9 *Wall Street Journal* op-ed, calling on Congress to reject the Commission's recommendation that American firms investing in China be strictly monitored. The only member of the Commission who refused to sign the report was William Reinsch, president of the National Foreign Trade Council, a business group whose members include firms working to expand China's technology and industry. Reinsch was also a Commerce Department official in the Clinton administration. Last year, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce sponsored the Chinese ambassador's tours of major American cities. Local audiences were treated to Beijing's views on major international topics to promote "understanding" and a climate conducive to appeasement.

Too often America's private enterprise culture blinds leaders to the reality that it is the government that integrates economic and cultural resources behind national power. In China, this means a regime still firmly in the hands of a Communist-trained elite, fanning the flames of popular nationalism. Putting more of the global economy into Chinese hands could create a situation increasingly dangerous for the United States and its allies in Asia. ■

William R. Hawkins is Senior Fellow for National Security Studies at the U.S. Business and Industry Council in Washington, D.C.

Recasting the Constitution

Republicans are strict constructionists only when it suits them.

By Doug Bandow

WAR WITH IRAQ likely approaches, and it may be only the first of many if the Bush administration follows seriously its new doctrine of preemption. At least Congress voted on the record. Alas, if Iraq is any guide, Congress will only wave on this president or his successors in a future case, leaving them with plenary authority to go to war. And conservatives who now speak of remaking the judiciary to respect the Constitution will be leading the parade to abdicate Congress' responsibility.

Indeed, the president never even acknowledged that he would have been constitutionally bound by a "no" vote. If he was not, his request for a resolution was meaningless. White House lawyers reportedly told President Bush that he does not need congressional authority to go to war. Still, he sought legislative approval, or at least some form of "support," for political reasons. But the Constitution explicitly requires the Congress to "declare war." And the Founders' undoubted intention, even while recognizing the president's need to be able to respond defensively in an emergency, was to limit his war-making authority.

Virginia's George Mason, for instance, spoke of "clogging rather than facilitating war." Thomas Jefferson wrote of creating an "effectual check to the dog of war by transferring the power of letting him loose." Even Alexander Hamilton agreed. He reassured his countrymen in *Federalist* 69 that the president's authority was "in substance much inferior to [monarchical power]. It would amount

to nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the land and naval forces ... while that of the British King extends to the declaring of war and to the raising and regulating of fleets and armies; all of which by the Constitution would appertain of the legislature."

Alas, Bush 43 seems to be following in the footsteps of Bush 41. The latter said "I don't think I need it" when asked if congressional approval was necessary before attacking Iraq more than a decade ago. Why? "Many attorneys," he said, had "so advised me." Too bad neither Bush apparently reads the Constitution himself.

The president is the commander-in-chief, but only within the legal framework established by the Constitution and Congress. He cannot just create a military—Congress must authorize the forces and approve the funds. Congress is also tasked with setting rules of war and organizing the militia. The president can negotiate a treaty ending a conflict, but the Senate must ratify it.

If the president can unilaterally order an attack on a nation halfway around the globe, which has not attacked the U.S., posed an imminent threat, or provided a traditional *casus belli*, the Constitution is dead. And if conservatives treat the Constitution as dead when it suits them, they should stop complaining when federal judges, liberal activists, and Democratic politicians do the same.

Consider for a moment how this disdain for the Constitution might look if applied to other issues. Why, for

instance, require congressional approval to impose taxes and borrow money? To be sure, the Constitution lists this as one of the legislature's enumerated powers, but that outmoded provision need not dictate present policy, especially as Congress itself long ago dropped any pretense that the lack of explicit constitutional authority limited its power.

If the president sees a critical need, he should not have to wait for Congress to act—and certainly not if selfish, petty, and politically minded legislators say "no." Nor should the nation's fiscal health be impaired by pork-minded congressmen who lard essential bills with special interest subsidies. Whatever the merits of the Founders' scheme two centuries ago, the president should be able to cut wasteful spending on his own authority, without having to veto entire bills or fear being overridden.

Article 1, Section 8 also empowers Congress to "establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization" as well as bankruptcy and patent laws. But look at what a mess legislators have made of the first, with foreigners coming to America to kill. Populists are doing their best to block bankruptcy reform, despite manifold abuses by debtors who want to take the money and run. Patents involving pharmaceuticals are currently subject to a bitter congressional fight. Forget the Constitution: Let the president decide. monopoly.

The problem of judicial activism would have disappeared had President Franklin Delano Roosevelt been able to

The American Cause presents

THE GREAT DEBATE **The De-Industrialization** **of America**

February 7-8, 2003
Crystal City Hilton
Arlington, Virginia

*See Pat Buchanan,
Pat Choate, Jock Nash, and
others debate U.S. Trade Policy.*



Reserve your place today.

Call (703) 237-2034

for more information or
mail the form below to:

The American Cause
115 Rowell Court
Falls Church, VA 22046

THE GREAT DEBATE **De-Industrialization** **Conference**

- ☐ Reserve ____ conference
ticket(s) at a price of \$75 each.
- ☐ Send me more information about
the conference.

Name _____

Address _____

City, State, Zip _____

Phone _____

pursue his "court-packing" plan. Why should some abstract constitutional provisions and congressional intransigence have prevented him from doing what had to be done? Indeed, we could dispense with congressional approval of presidential nominations. The Senate's "advise and consent" function is outmoded; the president should simply declare his nominees to be in office.

Moreover, consider the potential of executive predominance during the ill-fated health care debate of 1993-1994. The crisis should have been obvious to all but the most reactionary partisan. Tens of millions of people without health insurance, sharply rising medical and insurance costs, growing popular dissatisfaction with the system. Yet rather than working with the president, Congress thwarted Bill Clinton's efforts. The GOP was especially shameless, using the issue for its own electoral gain.

Now, almost a decade later, the same problems remain with us. If only the president had had the courage to act unilaterally. Consider the speech that he could have given explaining why he was putting the Health Security Act into effect on his own authority: "I realize that some people of good will believe that the Constitution gives this power to Congress. But there are few issues more important than Americans' health. Many lawyers have told me that the Constitution established an energetic chief executive, vesting him with final authority for protecting the public. Other presidents have shared this view, using their power to issue executive orders and regulations to solve problems when Congress failed to fulfill its responsibilities. In my view, that requires acting to assure secure health care for all Americans."

But why stop there? The Constitution's electoral scheme is notably defective. The mere fact that more than two centuries ago some dead white males concocted a system as cumbersome as

the Electoral College does not mean that we should follow it today. And if Congress will not approve a constitutional amendment to fix it, why should the president not unilaterally recognize the candidate who has greater popular legitimacy by winning the most votes?

What is most surprising is not that presidents routinely attempt to expand their war power authority, but that Congress is so ready to surrender its power. Of course, the partisan pirouettes are staggering. Democrats outraged at what they saw as persistent abuses by Presidents Nixon, Reagan, and Bush suddenly gained a strange new respect for executive power when President Bill Clinton was preparing to invade Haiti and attack Serbia. Republicans routinely defended executive privilege by "their" presidents and criticized Bill Clinton's propensity unilaterally to bomb other countries.

Still, why surrender the most important power, whether or not to go to war, to a competing branch? The U.S. Constitution says that the Congress decides what needs to be done. Today, anyway, many Republicans might prefer that the Constitution read differently. It does not.

The last president who understood this was Dwight Eisenhower, one of the few chief executives with command experience in the military. He respected the Constitution enough to announce, "When it comes to the matter of war, there is only one place that I would go, and that is to the Congress of the United States."

For all of the bizarre constitutional interpretations emanating from law schools, courts, and op-ed pages, most people recognize that the president's domestic powers are circumscribed by the law of the land. So too are his war powers. ■

Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute.

[coming to your neighborhood]

Radical Islam Rising

One percent of one billion is a lot.

By Arnaud de Borchgrave

IN A TRULY FREE election in Saudi Arabia with the royal family on the sidelines bereft of the divine right of kings, and Osama Bin Laden as a candidate for prime minister, the world's most wanted terrorist would win hands down. So spoke, albeit privately, one of the most important non-royals who manages a big chunk of the royal family's portfolio of financial assets.

Bin Laden, a member of a powerful and rich as Croesus non-royal family, is seen by countless millions of fundamentalist Muslims as the successor of several famous Islamic theologians going back all the way to Taqi al-Din ibn Taymiyya. Born in AD 1269, Taymiyya was prolix on *jihad* (holy war) against transgressors of the word of Allah as conveyed by the Prophet. This contemporary of Dante elevated *jihad* to the same level as the "five pillars" of Islam—prayer, pilgrimage, alms, faith ("No God but Allah and Mohammed is his Prophet"), and Ramadan.

The Age of Sacred Terror is a remarkable new book by two of the Clinton White House's counter-terrorist directors that delves into the roots of militant Islam and its *jihad* duties. Anyone who opposes *jihad* is an enemy of God.

"By asserting that *jihad* against apostates within the realm of Islam is justified—by turning *jihad* inward and reforging it into a weapon for use

against Muslims as well as infidels—[Taymiyya] planted a seed of revolutionary violence in the heart of Islamic thought," wrote co-authors Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon.

These two experts argue correctly it was precisely the weapon of *jihad* that heavily armed Muslim extremists turned to when they invaded and occupied the Grand Mosque in Mecca in November 1979. The House of Saud was momentarily paralyzed; they could not send security forces into the most sacred site in all of Islam with orders to shoot it out with the jihadis in the tunnels around the mosque. The royals turned to the French for help. The tunnels were flooded and high voltage cables dropped into the water. Most of the jihadis drowned or were electrocuted.

Any leader of a Muslim country who does not rule according to a strict interpretation of the *sharia* (Islamic law) is fair game for jihadis, as jihadi-in-chief Taymiyya ordained. It was Taymiyya's *fatwa* (religious decree) in 1303 against Mongol invaders and occupiers that turned the tide against Mongols who had converted to Islam.

If Taymiyya was Osama's first role model, the second was Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, born in 1703 in Arabia, then a remote, neglected part of the Ottoman Empire. He was steeped in the

works of Taymiyya that became religious pillars of back-to-basics Wahhabism. Its creed was that "innovation" was a grave sin against Islam. *Takfir* was proclaimed, which meant innovators were to be put to death.

Wahhab, allied with a local sheikh, Muhammad ibn Saud, fought to restore a strict interpretation of the faith. By the time he died in 1792, Wahhabism had conquered most of central Arabia.

The descendants of al-Wahhab and Ibn Saud continued this close alliance of religious zeal and territorial conquest—and forced the rest of the Arabian peninsula into zealous compliance.

Key modern-day literary firebrands on the side of Muslim revolutionary fervor included Abu al-Ala Maududi and Rashid Rida. They linked Islam with the rhetoric of communism and fascism, which is one of the keys to the success of Islamist extremists in the Oct. 10 elections in Pakistan.

A similar fusion occurred in Iran in the late 1970s when the ayatollahs and the underground Tudeh (Communist) party merged their efforts to undermine and overthrow the shah.

On Jan. 26, 1952, the fiery Muslim Brotherhood suddenly exploded on the Cairo scene by burning down some 300 buildings. King Farouk survived six more months until a military coup of "Free Officers," led by Gamal Abdel

Nasser, abolished the monarchy and allowed the king to sail on his yacht into comfortable exile in Monte Carlo.

The chief theoretician of the Muslim Brothers was Sayyid Qutb, who wrote non-stop during his desert imprisonment by Nasser. Hanged in 1965, his books are still bestsellers throughout the Middle East. His manifesto, *Signposts*, merged all the essential elements of revolutionary Islamism.

MUSLIMS ARE A MAJORITY IN 63 COUNTRIES. OF THE 30 CONFLICTS NOW UNDER WAY IN THE WORLD, 28 CONCERN MUSLIM GOVERNMENTS OR COMMUNITIES.

Qutb's views of America—derived from his stay in Greeley, Colo., while working on a master's in education—are widely shared today throughout radical Islam, and presumably derived from his works. Repelled by America's admiration for Israel, as well as the licentiousness and racism that pervaded the country, he decried American culture as foul and empty.

From Yasser Arafat's attempt to take over Jordan in September 1970 (dubbed Black September) and overthrow King Hussein, to the assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1981, Sayyid Qutb's outpourings provided the rationale to kill America's puppets.

The other branch of militant Islam sprang from anti-colonial sentiment in British-ruled India in mid-19th century. Known as Dar ul-Ulum (Realm of Learning), it took root at Deoband, in Uttar Pradesh. Deobandism, dedicated to the *salafi* conception of Islam, and Wahhabism are the two wings of Islamist fanaticism that continue to vie for influence in present-day Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, and Indonesia.

Ninety-nine percent of the world's 1.2

billion Muslims are moderate and see *jihad* as a self-cleansing process to get back on the path of spiritual excellence. Presidents Mubarak, Musharraf, Ben Ali (Tunisia), Kings Abdullah II of Jordan, Fahd of Saudi Arabia, Mohammed VI of Morocco, and other moderate Muslim leaders, all have told this reporter in the past two years that Islamist extremists are no more than 1 percent of their population.

When we reminded Musharraf that one percent of 140 million is 1.4 million, he said, "you're right, but I'd never thought of it that way." Now he realizes it's a lot more than one percent as politico-religious extremists won the provincial government in the Northwest Frontier Province adjacent to Afghanistan, a share of the Baluchistan government, and 20 percent of the seats in the new national parliament.

One percent of 1.2 billion is 12 million Muslim fanatics who believe America is the Great Satan, fount of all evil, to be attacked and demolished. Whether al-Qaeda is centralized as it was before 9/11 or decentralized, as it appears to be after Bali and Mombassa, is immaterial. Islam is the world's fastest growing religion. From Sweden (660,000 Muslims out of 5.8 million people) to Switzerland (also 10 percent), Senegal and Somalia in Africa, Sumatra and Singapore in Asia, and South America (especially Brazil and Venezuela), there are Wahhabi and Deobandi mosques. And that's just the countries beginning with the letter S.

Islamist terrorist groups have plenty of places to hide—from the tri-border

area of Brazil, Bolivia, and Paraguay where camps have been reported, to Colombia (where FARC terrorists have been hiding for 38 years), to Somalia in Africa, to Sumatra in Indonesia, Mindanao in the Philippines, even remote areas of the United States where radical Muslims were located, ostensibly engaged in peaceful pursuits.

Muslims are a majority in 63 countries. Of the 30 conflicts now under way in the world, 28 concern Muslim governments or communities. Amir Taheri, an Iranian author and journalist, says two-thirds of the world's political prisoners are held in Muslim countries, which also carry out 80 percent of all executions each year.

Most imams in the thousands of mosques in European countries can preach anti-U.S. and anti-Saudi-royal-family sermons with impunity. They carefully refrain from attacking the host country because intelligence services are probably listening. In Washington, D.C.'s principal Saudi-administered mosque, the imam gives politics a wide berth. Many diplomats friendly to the United States usually attend Friday prayers. Vehement anti-U.S. tirades, however, are average Friday fare throughout the Muslim world. Imams do pretty much their own thing. Islam has no pope, no pictures of the Prophet, and no simulated portraits of Allah, who is genderless. Hate-mongers among the radical clergy use western freedoms in order to denounce them.

Many of the imams in America's 2,000-plus principal mosques (for a population of five million Muslims) are recently naturalized U.S. citizens who were sent over as missionaries from both Iran and Saudi Arabia.

"We are spreading the good word of our faith in America," said the imam at the Islamic House of Wisdom in Dearborn Heights, Michigan, who came over from Iran ten years ago, "just as you

send Christian missionaries to sub-Saharan Africa." He also chided his interlocutor for dismissing his contention that 9/11 was a combined operation by the CIA and Mossad.

Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, the blind sheikh who is now serving a life sentence in the United States for his part in the World Trade Center truck bombing in 1993, is revered by Muslim radicals the world over.

Vatican sources concede they have been steadily losing ground in Africa to "the Muslim penetration" for the past 30 years.

In Pakistan, a friendly allied country at the Musharraf-Bush level, flat-earth clerics who educated the Taliban leaders have refused any reform of the madrassas, the Koranic schools that inculcate the fundamental belief that America and Israel are the new crusaders hell-bent on destroying Islam. They proselytize a great apocalyptic war, the War of Armageddon that will end in the Muslim conquest of Rome and all of Europe, and later America too. Some 750,000 young Pakistanis are presently in 11,000 madrassas where they are taught that *jihad* is the noblest of human endeavors.

Gen. Hamid Gul, a former Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence chief who hates America with a passion, boasted that a greater Islamic caliphate was fast approaching, one that would marry the oil riches of Saudi Arabia with the nuclear weapons of Pakistan, "which could then deal with America on an equal footing."

In Singapore, long before Gul's prediction, Lee Kuan Yew, known as Asia's Henry Kissinger, told UPI that the "greatest threat facing civilization over the next 10 years was an Islamist bomb and, mark my words, it will travel."

It is hard to escape the conclusion that a U.S. invasion of Iraq to topple Saddam and replace him with a pro-

American government will be seen throughout radical Islam, and large segments of moderate Islam as well, as yet another defeat that must be avenged with acts of terrorism. As the extremists read history, the defeat of the Ottomans at the gates of Vienna in 1683 triggered a reversal of Islam's fortunes that has continued ever since.

Is Islam, as President Bush keeps repeating, "a faith based upon peace and love and compassion" committed to "morality and learning and tolerance"? Yes and no. Radical Islam is committed to *jihad* against the United States and Israel, or a war of civilizations between the Judeo-Christian West and the impoverished Muslim world. The Wahhabis and Deobandis hate all things American, and are intolerant *vis-à-vis* all religions outside their own warped view of Islam.

Moderate Islam is yet to find a voice that will roll back the extremists, a sort of Islamic Martin Luther, or at least a Martin Luther King. ■

Arnaud de Borchgrave is editor at large of United Press International.

Copyright © 2002 United Press International

*The American
Conservative
makes a great gift
for a friend, loved
one, or recovering
neon.*

www.amconmag.com

1-800-579-6148

MOVING?

Attach your address label, write your new address below, and send to:

The American Conservative
Subscription Department
PO Box 10829
Riverton, NJ 08076-6229

Attach address label here:

(Important: please allow six weeks for address change)

(please print)

Name _____

Address _____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____

Email _____

Date of change _____

- ☐ Renew my subscription for a full year (24 issues) for \$49.97.
- ☐ Enter a new subscription for a full year (24 issues) for \$49.97
- ☐ Payment enclosed ☐ Bill me later
- ☐ At various times AC makes its mailing list available to other organizations. If you prefer that your name not be rented, please check here.

Arts & Letters

FILM

[*Solaris*]

Finding Love in the Twilight Zone

By Steve Sailer

BY RELEASING "SOLARIS" in 2,600 theatres over the long Thanksgiving weekend, 20th Century Fox was trying to squeeze a quick mass-market buck out of an intellectually inspiring but somber and befuddling art house film.

"Solaris" reunites director Steven Soderbergh and leading man George Clooney for the first time since their delightful blockbuster, "Ocean's Eleven." And James Cameron of "Titanic" takes a producer's credit for owning the rights to the novel by Polish highbrow science fiction author Stanislaw Lem. Despite all this box office firepower, "Solaris" is what talented rich guys do when they are in the mood to "give back" to their art.

Movie studios, however, are never in that mood, so the distributor has been trying to whip up a profitable controversy over two poorly lit shots of Clooney's posterior. "Solaris," though, is so restrained (sometimes to the verge of rigor mortis) that you otherwise would not even notice. But, then, what else can flacks chatter about when promoting a film that tries to inquire into the ineffable?

So, what is "Solaris" about? Well, it is about 1 1/2-hours long, which is 70 minutes shorter than the celebrated (if sel-

dom watched) version by the remarkable Russian director Andrei Tarkovsky.

He was a Christian artist, a follower of Dostoevsky working under a totalitarian atheist regime. Unlike dissident Soviet writers, who only needed paper and pencil, Tarkovsky's religious artworks required extracting millions of rubles worth of cooperation from a tyranny that owned all the means of production. Through force of will and a tendency toward obscurity, Tarkovsky managed to create five poetic movies in Moscow.

Tarkovsky's life story would make quite a movie, but nobody today seems interested in the seven communist decades—unlike the 12 Nazi years, which take up an ever-increasing space in our cultural memory.

Disguised as a "2001"-style science fiction tale about strange happenings on a space station orbiting a sentient planet, Soderbergh's "Solaris" is actually an erotic elegy about lost love.

These are difficult genres to combine, because the onset of the sex drive progressively narrows one's focus from the fate of humanity to the fate of one's genes. A prepubescent boy imagines mankind's future, but a middle-aged man dwells on his past.

A subdued Clooney plays a widower psychiatrist sent to investigate the vaguely described problems of the astronauts. When he arrives, a friend is dead, but the man's small son is running around the space station, which is odd, because the boy had died on Earth.

The two survivors offer little clarification. Jeremy Davies (Private Upham in "Saving Private Ryan") plays a maddeningly zonked technician as if he were a Charles Manson who had been hitting too hard on the interstellar bong. Viola Davis is a brusque scientist too busy handling a rambunctious "visitor" she

keeps locked in her cabin to enlighten Clooney.

It is bad form to give away the plot, but "Solaris" is so elliptical that viewers might need all the help they can get. And don't treat my interpretation as gospel—the main pleasure "Solaris" affords is standing around afterward arguing over "What the heck was that about?"

As far as I can make out, when Clooney falls asleep, he dreams of how he met his late wife (luminous English actress Natascha McElhone). When he awakes, she is sleeping beside him. Aghast, Clooney pops her into an escape capsule and shoots her off into space. The next morning, she is back again, as lovely and loving as ever.

She does not, however, seem to remember anything about her life on Earth except what he remembered about her. Evidently, the planet Solaris is somehow generating replicants out of the astronauts' memories.

To the disgust of Davis, who wants to use a subatomic supergun to exterminate the station's infestation of imaginary friends, Clooney devotes himself to patching up the marital rifts that led to his wife's tragic death. But Wife 3.0 soon realizes she is not real. She kills herself, only to resurrect.

This may sound more entertaining than it actually is. Soderbergh maintains a certain level of suspense over whether the planet has malign intentions for the astronauts, or even our entire species, but viewers waiting for a money shot in which, say, alien claws shoot out of the wife's eyeballs will be disappointed.

Extrapolating from Dylan Thomas's lines, "Though lovers be lost love shall not; And death shall have no dominion," the film ultimately resolves into a religious meditation on the workings of Heaven.

In Lem's novel, the planet Solaris is only a minor divinity, "a sick god whose ambition has exceeded his power." But this movie ends with a benevolent, forgiving God's representative welcoming Clooney to the afterlife with the same Sistine gesture with which God the Creator welcomed Adam to this world. Or at least that's what I think happens ... ■

Rated PG13 for mild eroticism and language.
Copyright © 2002 United Press International

BOOKS

[*Bush at War*, Bob Woodward,
Simon & Schuster, 400 pages]

You're Invited to the War Party

By Georgie Ann Geyer

EVER SINCE HIS Watergate revelations, which helped evict a president and change the United States for all time, for better or worse Bob Woodward has stood as the major force in a new genre of journalism. He talks, wheedles, and, using government officials' personal ambitions and dreams of political eternity, implicitly threatens his way into the often closed corridors of power—there, he is a master at getting a certain number of figures who try their best to remain aloof and unknown to tell their stories. The proposition, understood if not explicitly spoken, is that this book, as his former ones, will tell the story—you miss out on leave on this journalistic port, fellow, you miss the whole historic ship!

But once again with *Bush at War*, one has to wonder first what really is this genre? As with his other books, such as *The Agenda: Inside the Clinton White House*, the style is curt and commanding. It is easy and fully intended for the reader to get the impression that this is exactly the way it all really happened,

particularly since by far the largest part of the book is direct quote after direct quote, many of them quite complex and all totally impossible to check. There is also little contextual matter or balance and certainly no "other-think" even minimally allowed on the pages.

So, first, we need to keep in mind that the Woodward genre, or style, or indeed whatever we want to call it, is one that we might best and most legitimately call a kind of "journalistic political theater." And the important thing in theater is always, first, to know it is theater and thus not exactly life; but the next important thing is to realize that the discerning theater-goer, the person who has other facts and sufficient faculties of discernment at his fingertips, can gain enormous amounts of knowledge and reflection from a careful attendance to the stage and particularly from a skeptical perusal of the movements behind the curtains.

So, do not look in this book for "the whole story," but do look for incredible insights. Woodward walks us into the closed salons of this secretive administration, and that is a valuable escort service indeed.

First of all, *Bush at War* is really about the decision-making process in the upper levels of the Bush administration—the White House, the State Department, and the Pentagon—from the exact morning of Sept. 11th. It begins with a profoundly worried George Tenet, head of the CIA and, from all of the space he gets in the book, obviously one of Woodward's best and favored sources. That very morning, Tenet is wondering about when Osama bin Laden, whom he has been desperately tracking, will strike the U.S. Then "it" happens—and from then onward, the book delineates day-by-day, and sometimes hour-by-hour and minute-by-minute—what supposedly went on in meeting after meeting. From all accounts that I know of, Woodward's interpretations are exactly right; it is the quotes that are so bothersome.

But since so much of the material on the Afghan war has been covered

before, the clues as to a future attack on Iraq are the parts that are the most original and that I will therefore deal with here.

The "question of Iraq," for instance, was raised at a White House meeting of principals the very next day after the terrorist attacks. It was raised by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld but was actually reflecting the long-time obsession of Paul Wolfowitz, his aggressive deputy. In fact, Wolfowitz did not hesitate even to step in ahead of his demanding boss that day in regaling the president on Iraq. "Wolfowitz seized the opportunity," Woodward writes. "Attacking Afghanistan would be uncertain. He worried about 100,000 American troops bogged down in mountain fighting in Afghanistan six months from then. In contrast, Iraq was a brittle, oppressive regime that might break easily. It was doable. He estimated that there was a 10 to 50 percent chance Saddam was involved in the September 11 terrorist attacks."

Here you come upon some of the many revealing counterpoints in the score. Some, like Wolfowitz and the group of neoconservative zealots, with their intimate ties to the hardest parts of the Israeli Right, wanted to attack and ultimately "reconfigure" the entire Middle East for their own and Israel's interests, and soon they were moving Heaven and Earth to convince the president that Iraq constituted, not a mere 10 to 50 percent of the problem, but 100 percent of it. Some of the president's advisors also genuinely feared Saddam's possible use of weapons of mass destruction. But there is also a persistent undercurrent of macho thinking that, hey, we've got the weapons: "Should they think about launching military action elsewhere as an insurance policy in case things in Afghanistan went bad?" Woodward paraphrases these moments. "They would need successes early in any war to maintain domestic and international support." And besides, Rumsfeld was "deeply worried about the availability of good targets in Afghanistan."

All the while, the "rational" group in the leadership is warning, warning, warning, like a Greek chorus awakening every once in a while to take center stage. Secretary of State Colin Powell warns against the U.S. being seen as "playing the superpower bully" and tries to tell the president that the behavior of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, with whom Bush seemed taken with almost a childlike admiration, "borders on the irrational." Powell is "uncomfortable with random regime change." Powell, his State Department staff, and prominent White Housers like the president's more cautious, New England-born Chief of Staff Andrew H. Card Jr. are the hold-outs to the radical, macho, neocon, Likudnik, former Cold Warriors who are not, the book makes clear, at all conservatives in any traditional sense.

It is these "warriors," or the "War Party," or the "cabal," as different elements in the press have dubbed them, who would soon weave their own obsession with Iraq over a Texas president first totally inexperienced in foreign affairs and finally obsessed himself that he and he alone—through his instinct rather than his intellect—has been called to a religious duty in the Middle East to rid the world of Saddam Hussein!

The portrait that comes through of George W. Bush is itself revealing. Here again, Woodward does not directly try

to characterize him, but the direct quotes from his many interviews with "W" often paint a frankly odd picture.

According to Woodward, the president, contrary to much critical thinking, did not embrace the Iraqi war from the very beginning, nor did he embrace it consistently. According to the book, he went up and down on it, his moods vacillating from the emotional conviction that his "father's generation was called" (and now, so is he) to watching the polls and depending upon the political response around the country. At the end of the book, when he finally meets with a deeply worried Colin Powell, after months in which, astonishingly, his own secretary of state barely has access to him, Bush of course finally responds with a willingness to go to the UN and to place the problem before the world community, while Powell breathes a sigh of desperate relief.

Indeed, it is less Bush's immediate obsession with Iraq that is illustrated here, than a kind of religiously-inspired grandiosity of character is revealed. For instance:


"This will be a monumental struggle between good and evil," he says just after 9/11. He returns to the White House from Camp David one day, makes a brief statement to the press, and takes five questions: "He referred to 'evil' or 'evildoers' seven times and three times voiced amazement at the nature

of the attacks," Woodward writes. In another place, from Bush: "We haven't seen this kind of barbarism in a long period of time." He stops at a hockey game in Philadelphia, and, when the fans demand to watch his speech on the stadium's overhead video screens and the players huddle to watch," Bush says with wonder, "They wanted to hear what the commander in chief, the president of the United States, had to say during this moment! I have never felt more comfortable in my life."

Another time, he says to Woodward, "I'm the commander—see, I don't need to explain—I do not need to explain why I say things. That's the interesting thing about being the president. Maybe somebody needs to explain to me why they say something, but I don't feel like I owe anybody an explanation."

At still another point after the Afghan war has started, the president says to his staff, "Look, our strategy is to create chaos, to create a vacuum." And Woodward ends the book with another quote from the president, in which he again reflects the obsessive chaos theory of the neoconservatives surrounding him like sentinels and for whom Iraq has become the *sine qua non* of political existence: "We will export death and violence to the four corners of the earth in defense of our great nation." Whew.

We must remember here that, since the president has given so few interviews since he was elected and since he has kept himself so errantly far away from the press and indeed almost anyone except those in the War Party, these quotes are quite remarkably revealing. He himself says proudly in the book, repeatedly, that he hates and distrusts the media and adds that he does not see the mail either. Very well. One has the right to humor one's preferences, but in fact, the serious and informed press is an invaluable tool of information for any leader and it does not hurt to hear the public's voices either. He declares continuously here that he trusts his "instinct"—but a good and informed instinct only exists in play to the life experiences its holder has had.



"Kathleen, I have a confession. I've been cold and indifferent with another woman."

The principle behind the Bush thinking, the book says, is, "this is a new world." As a matter of fact, the world that we face today is an exceedingly old world: terrorism as a substitute for armed strength, violence against "the other," the arrogance of the affluent, the careless expectations of the powerful, and the ambitions of the zealous are all as old as the Bible to which George W. Bush so passionately ascribes.

The president says testily at one point in the book to Democrat Thomas Daschle, "I'm in the Lord's hands." One rather thinks, after reading this book, that much of the time now we all are indeed. ■

Georgie Ann Geyer is a nationally syndicated columnist and the author of Guerrilla Prince, The Untold Story of Fidel Castro.

[Democracy: The God That Failed: The Economics and Politics of Monarchy, Democracy, and Natural Order, Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Transaction Publishers, 220 pages]

The Democratic Road to Tyranny

By Clyde N. Wilson

HANS-HERMANN HOPPE'S theoretically disciplined examination of the present sad state of Western governments has received considerable and well-deserved attention. His diagnosis of the disease is superb. His recommended cure—the maximum individual disengagement and community secession from the state—is worth serious consideration by those who have learned that government is now without limits and its growth unstoppable by a mere change of parties.

His starting point, which used to be taken for granted by all thinkers in the

tradition of American republicanism, is that society is distinct from and more important than government. The purpose of government should be to protect society and otherwise interfere with it as little as possible. Man is a social being and naturally forms societies in which families go about the business of finding material and spiritual fulfillment, Hoppe's "natural order." But the state no longer nourishes society. (Hoppe would probably say it never has.) Rather it preys upon and distorts society.

This evaluation of the United States and other Western governments is what distinguishes real libertarians and real conservatives from the left libertarians and neoconservatives who flourish today, as well as from mainstream party politics. Hoppe means to appeal to true libertarians and true conservatives, and he definitely has much to say that we should hear.

Why has the state become malignant to society? Hoppe's answer is democracy. He prefers monarchy, for which he builds a strong historical and theoretical case. Historically, the European monarchies of earlier days did not possess more than a tiny fraction of the power over life and property that democratic governments do. Monarchs could not collect income taxes or conscript the national manpower for total wars. They could oppress individuals but could not effectively oppress whole classes.

Theoretically, a monarch has incentives to nourish rather than loot his realm. Since it is the property of himself and his dynasty, it is in his interest to have a happy and wealth-building people over the long term, and the best way to achieve that is to leave them alone. Contrast that to democracy in which the rulers have no incentives to pursue the long-term welfare of the people. Since their possession of the benefits of rule is temporary, their incentive is to maximize their profit out of existing wealth and maintain their popularity by its redistribution.

Alas, the theory is pretty persuasive. Jefferson was making the same point

when he said that "the earth belongs to the living," by which he meant that the current generation can enjoy the usufruct of the earth. It cannot be bound by past generations, but more importantly, it has no right to bind future generations with its overspending and debts. John C. Calhoun was making the same point during the Jacksonian era when he damned the "spoils system" by which those who profited from government (that is, politicians and their beneficiaries) had become a class unto themselves that pursued power without reference to any other interest or principle. Thus, elections had become games designed to mislead the people rather than to represent them.

One can agree that democracy has in some sense failed, but I am not sure it was ever really a deity. Certainly it was not to the American Founding Fathers. Despite the heated rhetoric of grasping politicians, it seems to me that thinking people have always regarded democracy in the way that Churchill did—it is not a very good form of government, just better than all the others known.

That was certainly Jefferson's attitude. Since men are sinful and grasping, none can be trusted with much power (even to secure the alleged goods promised by the Hamiltonian elitists). That government which governs least is the best, and it is most likely achieved by adhering to the sense of a majority of serious citizens, who have no personal agenda. C.S. Lewis defended democracy on the same grounds. Because of original sin, none of us can be trusted, so it is best to have as many sensible people as possible in on the decisions that affect all.

Interestingly, the people who today are making a deity out of "global democracy" as "the end of history" are not democrats but (former?) socialists who used to worship socialism in the same way.

In what sense has democracy failed? The polls indicate that nearly seventy percent of the American people want to curtail the high levels of immigration we have been "enjoying" in recent years.

The president, the congress, the media, and both political parties will not respond to the people's will or even allow their concerns to become a matter of public deliberation. Is this a failure of democracy or a failure to have democracy? (Of course, the polls also seem to show 58 percent of the people approving of the president's plan to make unilateral war on a foreign country.)

It can be called a failure of democracy in the sense that the people do not rebel against being governed by federal judges, faceless media moguls, nameless bureaucrats, and the champion scoundrels who have managed to work themselves into "leadership" of the two-party system. But is it possible that conditions might improve if we had more democracy rather than less?

I agree with Hoppe that paper constitutions have proved ineffective checks on government usurpations of power. The Old Republicans had come to the same conclusion by the 1820s. If a president can launch a war by his own decision and federal judges can give sweeping orders to citizens and officials about personal and local matters, then it is deceitful and ludicrous to argue over interpretation of a document that is no longer binding except in minor details.

I am inclined to give a bit more weight to other offending factors than the undoubted villainy of career democratic politicians in the excessive growth of government. Governments have grown in Europe, I suspect, because of class conflict, envy, and the over-active Germanic penchant for order. In other words, national characters must bear some of the blame.

I know a young lad, twelve years old or so, who comes from a liberal Midwestern family. Concerned about the over-consumption of oil, he wrote the president not long ago that to conserve fuel he should make everybody ride horses. This is unfortunately one side of the American national character that has been with us since the settlement of Massachusetts Bay. I have an insight, therefore the federal government must make it imperative and universal. This

is why Bob Dole, who claimed to have the Tenth Amendment in his pocket, and George H.W. Bush pushed through the Americans with Disabilities Act. In order to make themselves feel benevolent, they were willing to extend federal control over every building and parking lot in the fifty states and impose immense costs upon the people. You cannot blame this on democracy, I think, or even on redistributive envy.

Unlike Hoppe, I have not completely lost faith in democracy, though I value his telling critique, nor do I have quite as much faith in monarchy. In fact, what we have now is exactly what Jefferson meant when he espied a tendency toward "monarchy" in some parts of the American body politic. Nor am I quite convinced, as much as I admire Hoppe's Rothbardian analysis, that the operation of economic man freed of the burden of government will solve everything. Society and man's life are finally God-given mysteries that do not yield completely to rational action. There are intangibles. For instance, an army that defends its people has to have in its nature something more than the organization and skill of a defensive force hired by an agreement among property-holders.

Democracy: The God That Failed is an exemplary exercise in rigorous thought about government that is nearly absent from scholarly discourse today and completely absent from popular discourse. It is full of remarkable, telling, and quotable insights.

The author knows that we are not likely to restore monarchs, who are made by history, not by choice. The problem is to roll back a state that has already destroyed far too much of society's natural order and has already advanced to within a few steps of real tyranny. What we should do, he argues, is distance our minds and our goods as much as possible from the state. This means curing ourselves of its sacralization and recognizing it for the burdensome intrusion that it is and forming natural associations that withdraw themselves as far as possible from its

reach. That is, try to regain a measure of the self-government of communities of men, which is what democracy was supposed to be about to begin with. ■

Clyde N. Wilson is a professor of history at the University of South Carolina and editor of the Papers of John C. Calhoun.

[Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime, Eliot A. Cohen, The Free Press, 248 pages]

Solid History, Shaky Theory

By Correlli Barnett

IN *SUPREME COMMAND*, Professor Cohen has in effect interwoven within one volume two quite different narratives. The first consists of shrewd, well-informed, and insightful portraits of four great national leaders in time of war (Lincoln, Clemenceau, Churchill, and Ben-Gurion), while the second, and the less convincing, consists of an academic's thesis on the correct functional relationship between ruling politicians and their top military advisers and commanders.

Of Cohen's four chosen national leaders, only Abraham Lincoln came to supreme command without either some previous personal experience of war or of living through a time of major conflict. He therefore had to learn the trade of supreme commander while in the saddle after the guns had begun to fire. As Cohen shows, Lincoln brought to this process a quick intelligence and an open, questioning mind. He was fortunately endowed with a combination of clear politico-strategic vision and a grasp of military nuts-and-bolts.

Lincoln confronted all the greater challenge because, in American terms, the Civil War was unprecedented in its sheer human scale and because it also

witnessed a technical revolution in weaponry and logistics. Never before had masses of troops been moved and supplied by rail, and over vast distances; never before had such masses been centrally directed in the field thanks to an elaborate signals net based on the electric telegraph. Eliot Cohen rightly gives credit to Lincoln himself for driving these developments and their operational exploitation.

The president's most critical problem lay, however, in that his generals lacked experience of warfare on this scale: they too were learning on the job, but learning much more slowly than their genius of a political chief. The core of Cohen's essay on Lincoln therefore consists of an account of the president's often disappointed search for generals who would prove fit military instruments of his purpose. Cohen shows how Lincoln, under a guise of non-interference with his commanders, in fact closely questioned their plans and monitored their performance. He gives Lincoln credit for the decisive strategic insight of the war—that the Army of the Potomac's single objective must be the destruction of Lee's army.

Yet Cohen only gives a passing mention to a major Union military shortcoming, the cure of which lay solely within the purview of the political leadership: that is, the chaotic cycle of voluntary recruitment, desertion, and re-enlistment with a fresh bounty; a cycle compounded by the disastrous policy of raising fresh regiments instead of feeding reinforcements into those depleted by battle or sickness. All this resulted in a continuing manpower crisis in the Union armies and a failure to exploit to the maximum the Union's great superiority in population over the Confederacy.

George Clemenceau in 1917, like Churchill in 1940, took over national leadership at a time of disaster and peril and, like Churchill again, only because of the dismal failure of previous "sound" run-of-the-mill politicians. Eliot Cohen succinctly analyses Clemenceau's grim inheritance: a French army still conva-

lescing after the widespread mutinies caused by the costly failure of General Robert Nivolle's vaunted "war-winning" offensive of April-May 1917; subversive left-wing politicians in favor of a compromise peace (and indeed taking German backhanders); and a nation shaken and despondent after the dreadful but vain losses of 1914-1917.

Cohen describes how Clemenceau revived France's spirit by his ruthless action against defeatists and by his sheer ferocious will to wage and win the war. Like Lincoln, Clemenceau directly involved himself in matters of strategy and, as Cohen shows, brilliantly managed his disparate military team of the offensive-minded Foch as chief of staff and the cautious ("Firepower kills") Pétain, the commander-in-chief of the French army on the Western Front. Clemenceau spent much time learning first hand from frontline troops the realities of trench warfare—and inspiring them in turn with his own fighting spirit. He excelled in the difficult art of handling coalition partners, especially at a time when France's power was waning *vis-à-vis* Britain's and America's. He favored the creation of an allied supreme commander above the national commanders-in-chief and backed Foch for the job.

Yet, as Cohen also narrates, Clemenceau faced his biggest crisis in civil-military relations after the war had ended, when, during the Paris Peace Conference of 1918-19, Marshal Foch publicly lobbied for a permanent French occupation of the Rhineland in order to secure France against a German revival. Foch saw himself not as a soldier subordinate to a political chief, but as an equal collaborator entitled to a voice in high policy. Nonetheless, as Clemenceau well understood, Foch's proposal was politically out of the question, given the opposition of France's partners, Great Britain and the United States. It is therefore Cohen's judgment that the terms obtained by Clemenceau in the Versailles Treaty "were, on the whole, good ones"—the permanent demilitarization of the Rhineland and the limiting of the

German army to 100,000 men. The tragedy was that by the end of the 1920s the victors had lost the will to enforce these provisions.

Cohen is wrong, however, to say that Sir Douglas Haig, the c-in-c of the British armies on the Western Front, and Sir William Robertson, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, were against the concept of an allied supreme commander in principle. What they rightly fought was Prime Minister Lloyd George's devious intention to castrate their authority by placing British armies under the command of a foreign national c-in-c. Moreover, Robertson was surely correct in urging that a unified allied policy must precede a unified allied command—as was to happen in the Second World War, when Churchill and Roosevelt, with the advice of their combined staffs, hammered out common grand strategies for winning the war.

It was partly owing to Churchill's deft but resolute handling of relations with President Roosevelt, partly owing to the common language spoken by British and American politicians, civil servants, and military men, that the Anglo-American alliance in the World War II proved the closest and most successful in history. Despite hard-fought debates over grand strategy, there were none of the overt national divides that marred relations between Britain and France in World War I. Similarly, although ferocious arguments took place between Churchill and his principal military advisor, General Sir Alan Brooke, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, the relations between them remained those of professional colleagues on the same team—very different from 1914-18, when Lloyd George and his generals, mutually distrustful, fought each other from separate bureaucratic camps.

Eliot Cohen justly gives credit to Churchill for forging a united political and military team and by this means achieving the fusion of high policy and the conduct of war. He notes that like Lincoln and Clemenceau, Churchill was

very much a hands-on war leader, forever putting his civil and military subordinates—and government scientists—to the proof by searching inquiries and peremptory demands for “Action This Day.” Far from limiting himself to grand strategy, Churchill directly involved himself in the waging of key campaigns, such as the vital Battle of the Atlantic. Britain’s commanders learned to dread the Prime Minister’s prodding signals calling for offensive action, sometimes prematurely. Here was a leader who wanted to know—and in great detail.

Cohen regards as entirely admirable this assertion of political paramountcy over the conduct of war—and the accompanying paramountcy of political considerations over the purely military. Nevertheless, he fails to take note of Churchillian interventions based not on political factors but on mistaken strategic judgments, such as the ill-fated Norwegian campaign of 1940 and the disastrous attempt to seize the Dodecanese islands in 1943. Statesmen do not always get it right, and military men are not always wrong!

Professor Cohen’s final portrait, of David Ben-Gurion, the first Prime Minister of Israel, credits him with masterminding (under British mandatory rule in Palestine) the creation of a unified and well-prepared Jewish defense force from rival factions and so ensuring in 1948 the survival of the new state of Israel in the face of concentric Arab attacks. And Ben-Gurion, like Lincoln and Clemenceau, knew how to drive and inspire, as well as to control, his military subordinates.

So far so good. But now we come to Professor Cohen’s attempt to draw from his four portraits a theory about the proper relationship between political and military leaderships, and between state policy and the conduct of war. His attempt, however, rests entirely on a false premise—that there prevails what he repeatedly calls (in his own quotes) the “normal” theory of civil-military relations, by which, according to him, the politicians lay

down the political object of a war and then hand over to the military professionals to run the war without further political interference. To demolish this alleged “normal” theory is the underlying purpose of his book.

Yet who has the theory? Who among politicians or military men in the Western world today believes in such thing? If the belief does exist at all, is it peculiarly American? I can say that British soldiers, politicians, and military historians alike have long tacitly accepted Clausewitz’s dictum that war is a political activity and that therefore political considerations should rule its conduct from start to finish. Clausewitz indeed specifically states that simply to hand the conduct of a war over to the generals would be a dangerous absurdity—as the case of Hindenburg and Ludendorff in World War I goes to prove.

So who is Cohen trying to convince? Or is he simply elaborately stating the obvious—that politicians and generals should form a single united team, with policy always governing strategy and the conduct of operations?

Reading Cohen’s highly academic discourse, I am reminded of the theorizing by American military sociologists in the 1960s (Cohen himself mentions two of the more ingeniously mistaken), who believed that war should now be conducted like a big business, complete with statistical performance indicators; that the “warrior” model of a soldier was now outmoded, and armies should instead become “constabularies.”

These kinds of tosh became highly influential before the Vietnam War, when, as will be remembered, the United States forces had clearly won according to the performance indicators (body counts), but in fact had lost—not least because the North Vietnamese army proved the better “warriors.”

The real difference between the roles played by the four statesmen portrayed by Cohen and America’s politico-military conduct (which he discusses) of the Vietnam War does not lie in adher-

ence or non-adherence to the so-called “normal” theory. It lies in that, whereas Cohen’s chosen heroes led their countries in a time of direct national peril (and were indeed forged as outstanding leaders by that peril), Vietnam was a distant imperial adventure, as would be a war with Iraq.

Professor Cohen’s readers (especially in Washington) should therefore read the theorizing in *Supreme Command* in a spirit of skeptical caution. They and he would do well to remember the *New Yorker* cartoon of a brash young Crusader in armor telling a grizzled veteran at a siege: “I’ve never actually stormed a castle, but I’ve taken a bunch of siege-management courses.” ■

Correlli Barnett, CBE, is a Fellow of Churchill College, Cambridge, a former Keeper of the Churchill Archives Centre, and the author of The Verdict of Peace: Britain Between Her Yesterday and the Future.

[*A Long Way from Home: Growing Up in the American Heartland*, Tom Brokaw, Random House, 233 pages]

Up from South Dakota

By Joe Scotchie

AMERICAN NEWSREADERS, as the Brits might call them, have fallen on hard times. Years ago, men such as Walter Cronkite, plus the team of Chet Huntley and David Brinkley, asserted some influence on the nation’s political life. For instance, when Cronkite, in 1968, came out against the Vietnam War, a paranoid Lyndon Johnson declared that the entire nation would now oppose the conflict. With the rise of cable television, radio talk shows, and owing also to the networks’ own liberal bias, the three reigning anchors—Peter Jennings, Dan Rather, and Tom Brokaw—have, for the

past two decades, seen a significant plunge in the share of their nightly audience.

And so, all three, hoping to cash in on their celebrity status, have turned to writing books. With his huge bestseller about World War II, *The Greatest Generation*, Brokaw has been the big winner in the books sweepstakes. *A Long Way From Home* turns to a different theme: namely, the re-telling of the classic tale of the small town boy who succeeds in the big city.

The book has its moments, especially the chapter, "Work" about Red Brokaw, the author's father, and his hard life on the plains. In addition, the chapter, "Failure Is An Option" where Brokaw recounts his foppish undergraduate days, succeeds at some much needed self-deprecation. Red Brokaw is the book's hero. The youngest of nine children, Red left school at age 10 and began a life of manual labor, eventually rising to a skilled craftsman of decent means by working on highways, airports, and a big dam being constructed on the Missouri River.

Also interesting is how Brokaw neatly compares his own world of deadlines, news reporting, foreign travel, strange hours, and "occasional danger" to that of his ancestors, a stoic, uncomplaining people who could "break the stubborn soil of the northern prairie, harvest a crop, butcher a cow, fix a fence, dig a well, build a house, and repair machinery," men who were married to women who could "bake bread, plant a garden, hang out a wash, put up preserves, make soap, sew a family wardrobe, and nurse a sick child or a frail calf."

Brokaw's great-grandfather helped to found the South Dakota town of Bristol. His family eventually ran a hotel there. The spirit of giving that also distinguished the old America shines through when a boarder, a quiet Swedish immigrant, discreetly pays a debt that otherwise would have shut down the hotel for good. Meanwhile, at the hotel, a Sunday dinner for boarders consisted of selections that included helpings of

roast turkey with dressing, roast beef *au jus*, mashed potatoes, white and brown bread, strawberry shortcake, assorted cakes and pies, ice cream, tea, coffee, and milk—all for a mere 50 cents. Either way, it sure beats lunch at McDonald's.

In all, Brokaw gives us a vision of pre-welfare-state America, which, for all its incredible hardships, had a citizenry that enjoyed a sense of abundance and liberty that today's hurried, overtaxed, overregulated moderns cannot hope to achieve. No one wants to go back to a world without indoor heating or running hot water, not to mention modern-day medical technologies. Still, much can be learned from studying Red Brokaw's generation.

The second half of the book mostly summarizes Tom Brokaw's idyllic boyhood: hunting, fishing, joining the Boy Scouts, playing for organized football, baseball, and basketball teams, plus his first radio and television jobs. Inadvertently, Brokaw also makes the case for 1950s America. Athletic boys played manly football, not alien soccer. Brokaw's high school graduation program lists time for an invocation and benediction from local pastors, plus a chorus that sings such songs as "Prayer" and "Almighty God of Our Fathers"—all apparently without complaint from the local ACLU.

Seeking economic security, Red Brokaw preferred government work to a job in the private sector, one that could have paid more. Either job, though, paid enough. The 1950s were a time when a man, even without a high school diploma, could support a family of six on one paycheck.

These are my observations. Brokaw himself does not make them. Instead, the inevitable bows to political correctness make their way into the later chapters. Brokaw, as it turns out, harbors a significant guilt about having been born white and male in early 20th century America. He feels equally guilty about growing up in mostly white, Christian communities. To make amends, Brokaw scolds his hometown for its earlier atti-

tudes towards women. Another chapter castigates the entire state of South Dakota for its one time treatment of its American Indian minority. Brokaw seems to think his success is due in large part to his race and gender. Being a run-of-the-mill political liberal did not hurt either.

A Long Way from Home is about a heartland upbringing. Brokaw might have grown up in South Dakota, but he really is not a man of Middle America. He notices certain changes in the South Dakota landscape—WalMarts, the rise of corporate agriculture—but he displays no anxiety about the future of the nation's conservative heartland. The sharp decline of the family farm is of no great concern to him. Brokaw's liberalism is probably an outgrowth of both his father's mild populism and his sympathy for the underdog, sentiments that Franklin D. Roosevelt had no difficulty in exploiting during the 1930s. Brokaw also seems to be someone who would accept whatever American liberalism evolves, or more to the point, disintegrates into.

The book could have been something much better. If Brokaw had written a history/memoir solely about a grade-school dropout who manages, against all odds, to make a decent living for his family, then it would have been a fine effort, even a classic in our Great Plains literature.

Instead, the author, every now and then, indulges the vanity he had hoped to avoid. Do we really need, on page 146, a blowup of Brokaw's high school diploma? Do we need to know that he gets plum seats at World Series and NBA games? Or that he received a multimillion-dollar contract from NBC? *A Long Way from Home* is for those who enjoy reading about the rise of an earnest small town lad. But in the process, readers should also be prepared to digest steady helpings of liberal commentary. ■

Joe Scotchie's most recent book is *Revolt from the Heartland: The Struggle for an Authentic Conservatism (Transaction)*.

[*The Next Christendom: The Coming of Global Christianity*, Philip Jenkins, Oxford University Press, 220 pages]

Christianity's Southern Strategy

By Harold O. J. Brown


"WHETHER WE LOOK backward or forward in history, we can see that time and again, Christianity demonstrates a breathtaking ability to transform weakness into strength." With these words Philip Jenkins concludes a fascinating new perspective on the future of Christians and Christianity, interesting—and encouraging—to those of us who are depressed by the virtual collapse of Christian practice in its former European heartland and troubled by the confusion and disorientation evident in Christianity in North America, even though so many American churches are filled every Sunday, not merely at Christmas and Easter. Jenkins, a professor of history and religious studies at Penn State University, only gradually lets us sense his sympathy for Christianity, particularly of a more traditional sort, and that he looks forward with enthusiasm to a splendid future for the Church of Christ, albeit one strikingly different from what more conventional Western observers might hope.

He begins with a good and concise summary of the growth and expansion of Christianity, stressing the often forgotten fact that the Christian Church was established in the Near East, or West Asia, as the Indians call it, and North Africa when much of Europe was being overrun by German and Slavic peoples as yet untouched by the Gospel. The subsequent emergence of Islam and its rapid military conquest of much of the Near East, all of North Africa, the Spanish peninsula, reaching up even into northern Gaul—modern France—

before being finally stopped and thrown back by Charles Martel at Tours in AD 732, only one hundred years after the death of its Prophet. From that date on, Islam was slowly pushed back in the West, until all of Spain was recovered by the Spanish monarchs Ferdinand and Isabella in 1492, the same year that Columbus discovered America. In the east, except for the brief interlude of the Crusades, successful at first but eventually defeated, Christianity was gradually pushed back. The once glorious Christian Roman Empire of the East (usually called the Byzantine Empire, although it called itself Roman), with its capital at Constantinople, was utterly wiped off the map with the capture of Constantinople in 1453. Islam continued to push into southeastern Europe, repelled once at Vienna in 1529 and again more dramatically in 1683. Even though Russia and the Slavic East became Christian, the center of Christianity for several centuries appeared to be in Western Europe, giving rise to what Jenkins calls the myth of Western Christianity. It was from Christian Western Europe that North and South America were colonized and Christianized from the sixteenth century and from Western Europe and to a lesser degree North America that much of Africa and parts

of Asia were colonized and evangelized.

The vigor of Western Christianity began to wane in Europe, gradually in the second half of the nineteenth century and rapidly after World War I, with the result that if one thinks of the West as Christendom, then Christendom would seem to be facing virtual extinction, or as Jenkins says, death. How then can he write a book that ultimately brings an astonishing message of hope? The bulk of his book emphasizes three developments, all too often unrecognized in the West, even in Christian circles. First, in what he calls the South—Latin America, Africa, and the rim of southern Asia—Christianity is expanding even faster than the exploding populations. It is true, as the writer objectively documents, that in many places the growth of Christianity has taken on many exotic features. Often the vagaries of new African varieties of Christianity take on characteristics that seem very bizarre to us in the West. Jenkins takes note of this but expresses the conviction that the growth, often characterized by features common to the early Church and all but forgotten later, such as healing miracles and other evidences of outpourings of the Holy Spirit, is on the whole compatible with traditional Christianity.



The day all the missing socks came back.

COPYRIGHT BY RANDY GLASBERGEN. WWW.GLASBERGEN.COM

Second, Christians from the newly Christian regions of Africa and Asia, as well as from Latin America, are moving into Western Europe and North America and often bringing a revitalized Christianity with them. In addition, they are making their influence felt in traditionally liberal western bodies, such as the Anglican/Episcopal churches. In the Lambeth Conference of 1998, it was Anglican bishops from Africa and Asia—now constituting a slight majority of the conference—who frustrated the desire of radical prelates from North America and England to permit the introduction of homosexual priests into the Anglican ministry. Liberal mainline Protestants and liberal Roman Catholics may look disdainfully at the enthusiasm coming up from the South, and exhibit a strange kind of indifference to the gradual erosion of their own position in what used to be the Christian heartland of the West, but traditional Christians, both Protestant and Catholic, cannot help but rejoice at this unexpected support from places that they recently regarded as mission fields.

The third emphasis of *The Next Christendom* is a very accurate and alarming description of the growing hostility of Islam to Christians and to the West. Western powers, no longer used to taking their own Christianity seriously, have yet to come to terms with the reality that Muslims do take Islam very seriously indeed and that the zeal of the most radical among them is a growing danger to the power of a West that does not seem to understand them. Islam too is growing in the South and where it is in contact with Christianity violence is common. Christians are not innocent, but Jenkins, in contrast to so much politically correct thinking in the West, makes it very plain that it is virtually always the Muslims who take the torch to churches, not Christians who burn mosques. There is also a section on the antagonism between Islam and the Jews. Jenkins points out that American support for Israel intensifies Muslim hatred for the West and for Christians and implies that our failure to recognize

and interpret this is a source of weakness for our foreign policy. He also draws a picture of other religious conflicts, frequently taking the role of violence on Christians by Hindus. He portrays the importance of Christian conversion among India's "untouchables," and notes the hostility with which the Hindu majority regards this development.

These few lines give only a superficial overview of a book that is very important for all Americans thanks to its trenchant analysis of global problems with which our nation must now deal and especially for Christians because in the midst of some very depressing developments here and abroad, it offers a solid hope for the future of the Church in the twenty-first century. ■

Harold O. J. Brown is Professor of Theology at Reformed Theological Seminary, Charlotte, N.C., and editor of the Religion and Society Report.

[*Thomas Jefferson and the Wall of Separation Between Church and State*, Daniel L. Dreisbach, New York University Press, 274 pages]

Tear Down This Wall

By K.R. Constantine Gutzman

ALONG WITH GEORGE WASHINGTON, Thomas Jefferson may be the man most closely associated in the popular imagination with the American Revolution and the founding of the United States. While he actually had nothing to do with drafting or ratifying either the Constitution or the Bill of Rights, Jefferson has served, since his 1801 election as president, as a symbol of egalitarianism, democracy, freedom of speech, and freedom of the press.

The most famous thing Jefferson did, undoubtedly, was to write the first draft

of the Declaration of Independence. While Jefferson's famous second sentence ("We hold these truths to be self-evident...") has inspired some, horrified others, and impressed a third group as entirely implausible, Jefferson's chief accomplishment has had even greater effects. That accomplishment was his Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom, which established a purely secular government in Virginia.

Elucidating the principle of federalism and of non-interference by government in religion, President Jefferson coined his second-leading contribution to everyday American political thought: his metaphor of "a wall of separation between church and state." Used by the Supreme Court as the talisman of its religious establishment jurisprudence since 1947, the notion of such a wall is familiar to every educated American. Everyone knows that this is the key to the American constitutional system, the feature distinguishing the U.S. from Saudi Arabia, Nepal, and England.

The main question American University professor Daniel L. Dreisbach addresses in his new book on Jefferson's metaphor is, to borrow from Mark Twain, whether what everyone knows about the First Amendment and religion "just ain't so." Dreisbach's careful description of the process leading up to the drafting of Jefferson's 1802 letter to the Danbury Baptists, in which he coined the wall metaphor, will leave the attentive reader with the clear impression that indeed, the idea of the First Amendment as a bar both to governmental influence on religion and to religious influence on government is a myth. Dreisbach demonstrates that Jefferson repeatedly took actions in the area of religion that seem directly at odds with contemporary understanding of his wall metaphor. The clear implication is that Jefferson did not understand the metaphor to require so strictly irreligious a government as his 21st-century acolytes claim.

The first chapter of *Thomas Jefferson and the Wall of Separation Between Church and State* tells the story of the

drafting of the Danbury Baptists letter in the context of the presentation to then-President Jefferson of America's largest cheese. Four feet in diameter and 17 inches deep, this cheese appeared at the Executive Mansion thanks to a group of Massachusetts Baptists headed by the famous preacher John Leland, who thrilled at their hero's ascension to the chief magistracy of the United States. Even as he drafted the letter to the Danbury Baptists, the president demonstrated his appreciation of the cheese by attending a Baptist service with Leland. Obviously, Jefferson's notion of the proper relationship between religion and government did not involve so strict a separation as some latter-day exegetes of the "wall" letter have thought.

Dreisbach notes that the phrase "a wall of separation between church and state," far from being original with Thomas Jefferson in 1802, actually can be traced in Anglo-American legal disputation at least to 1590. He also makes clear that the use to which Justice Hugo Black put the metaphor in his opinion in the 1947 *Everson* case was based on radically flawed history: Jefferson insisted throughout his life that the First and Tenth Amendments both meant that legislation concerning religion was left entirely to the states, as the excerpt from the Kentucky Resolutions included among Dreisbach's appendices illustrates; in addition, his Danbury Baptists letter was intended for the quotidian, tactical purpose of shaming the established, Federalist, Congregationalist clergy of New England into silencing its campaign against Jefferson.

Not only does the Supreme Court's preemption of religious regulation in the states turn Jefferson's interpretation of the First Amendment on its head while gutting the Tenth Amendment, Jefferson's favorite provision of the federal constitution, but it makes of a common political statement what Mikhail Gorbachev might call a "world-historical" document.

Come to think of it, why should any-

one consult Thomas Jefferson as to the meaning of the First Amendment? After all, as Dreisbach repeatedly notes, Jefferson was a member neither of the Philadelphia Convention nor of the First Congress; more pertinently (but somehow ignored by Dreisbach), he did not participate in the ratification of the federal constitution or in the states' ratification of the First Amendment.

Justice Black and his supporters never have provided an adequate response to this question other than to point to the key role Jefferson played in establishing revolutionary Virginia's *avant-garde* separationism. As John Witte Jr. has shown, however, Virginians were highly atypical in their perception of the change the Revolution had wrought on government's religious responsibilities. Therefore, whatever limited claim Jefferson might have been thought to have to our attention when we come to interpret the First Amendment's religion clauses turns out, on further inspection, to be non-existent.

Dreisbach's book consists of 128 pages of text by the author and a wealth of related historical material in nine highly illuminating appendices. They predictably include all of Jefferson's correspondence in drafting the 1802 letter to the Danbury Baptists. In addition, however, the reader will find a draft proclamation of a day of prayer and fasting written by then-Burgess Jefferson in 1774 and a letter to Jefferson's home parish of the Anglican Church informing them of their representatives' proclamation of a day of prayer and fasting, which certainly would make Americans United for Separation of Church and state blanch. Jefferson's "Bill for Punishing Disturbers of Religious Worship and Sabbath Breakers" is found in Appendix 3, right after his draft of the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom—upon which it sheds a great deal of light. A Sabbath breaker, according to Jefferson's bill, was anyone who "on Sunday sh[ould] himself be found laboring at his own or any other trade or calling, or sh[ould] employ his apprentices, servants or

slaves in labour, or other business, except it be in the ordinary hous[e]hold offices of daily necessity." Such a miscreant was to pay a substantial fine, if Jefferson had his way. Also in the same appendix, Dreisbach has included Jefferson's bill empowering the Executive Branch of the Commonwealth's government to appoint days of prayer and fasting when the General Assembly was not in session. The fine Jefferson wanted ministers who did not conduct appropriate services on such days to pay, fifty pounds, was very heavy. Appendix 4 provides the text of Governor Jefferson's November 1779 proclamation of a day of prayer and fasting, and the following appendix includes the aforementioned excerpt from the Kentucky Resolutions.

Even a cursory reading of these documents must leave the reader with the clear sense that Jefferson's wall metaphor was not the product of a mind as hostile to religion as that metaphor's contemporary exponents, including those on the federal bench, often seem to be.

In the relatively short space taken by his own contribution, Dreisbach adds to his account of the Danbury letter's origin both a critique of the courts' use of the "wall" metaphor and a rumination upon the use of metaphors in legal opinions generally. He explores the writings of several legal theorists to good effect, making the excellent point that metaphor, if raised to the level of rule in legal language, must necessarily distort the interpretation of the provision at issue. Since metaphors are, by definition, not literally true, to treat them as if they were almost necessarily leads to misapplication of the principle the metaphor is intended to clarify.

One difficulty inherent in Jefferson's formulation is overlooked by Dreisbach: How can a Christian participate in government while leaving his faith outside? He cannot. Instead, he must concoct disingenuous policy arguments that do not rely upon Christian reasoning for their support. This is one cost of Justice

Black's and his colleagues' decision to enforce their understanding of Jefferson's metaphor in place of the historical First Amendment. "Something there is," Dreisbach quotes Robert Frost saying, "that doesn't love a wall." Enforcement of the Founders' ban on federal establishment of one sect in preference to all others would not entail so many difficulties as does the enforcement of Jefferson's metaphor. ■

K.R. Constantine Gutzman is professor of history at Western Connecticut State University.

[*World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Violence and Global Instability*, Amy Chua, Doubleday, 338 pages]

Globalization's Many Discontents

By Paul Craig Roberts

YALE UNIVERSITY LAW professor Amy Chua writes in *World on Fire* that "free market democracy" has an Achilles' heel: market-dominant minorities. The disproportionate success attained by market-dominant minorities foment ethnic hatreds. Democracy provides the envious and resentful majority the means to strike at the successful minority, making conflict inherent in "free market democracy."

What is to be done? Chua is too realistic to offer pie-in-the-sky alternatives to markets and democracy. After relating examples of how "free market democracy" works against itself in countries with multi-ethnic populations, she recommends that market-dominant minorities protect themselves with image management and good works. In the last line of her book, Chua reaches the conclusion: "It is difficult to see, in

any event, how a little generosity and humility could possibly hurt."

It is difficult to see how such a weak conclusion justifies her publisher's claim that *World on Fire* is that rare book that "gets everyone thinking in a new way." If Chua or her editor were aware that her ground had been more expertly ploughed by Alexis de Tocqueville, Thomas Sowell, and Peter Bauer, Chua's knowledge of ethnic and tribal conflicts might have been put to better use.

Having nothing to offer but a report on ethnic and tribal conflicts, Chua tries to compensate by connecting globalism to market-dominant minorities. She writes that globalism disproportionately benefits these minorities and thus exacerbates hatreds and political instability. She blames the U.S. government and International Monetary Fund for contributing to ethnic conflict by promoting free market democracy throughout the non-Western world.

In this indirect way Chua takes issue with the neoconservative view, that exporting free markets and democracy to other countries will increase peace and prosperity throughout the developing world. Chua, however, seems no less interventionist-minded than neoconservatives, and as she neither believes that a government-run economy produces better results than the market nor that authoritarianism is preferable to democracy, she fails to challenge the neoconservative view.

Chua is on shaky ground when she blames market-dominant minorities on globalism. Such minorities long predate globalism and exist in lands that can by no stretch of the imagination be labeled free market or democratic. "Free market democracy" is an intellectual construct that nowhere exists.

At times Chua's book reads like an aimless rant against free markets and *laissez-faire* capitalism. Perhaps she is letting off emotional steam over inequalities that reason tells her are intractable, based as they are in historical, cultural, and genetic differences. The left-wing is frustrated by the realization that society

cannot be remade unless history, the gene pool, and human nature itself can be recast.

If truth be known, political correctness prevents Chua from bringing her knowledge of ethnic conflicts to bear on multiculturalism where it belongs. She is honest and bold enough to acknowledge the reality of ethnic hatreds, but her supposition that such hatreds are market driven is merely a repetition of 19th century Marxist economic determinism.

Certainly the U.S. government and the IMF should take care not to export policies that worsen ethnic conflicts, but the more powerful conclusion to be drawn from Chua's material—a conclusion that Chua studiously avoids—is that the U.S., Europe, the U.K., Australia, Canada, and New Zealand should immediately cease and desist from reconstructing themselves as multi-ethnic societies. Accentuating ethnic conflict abroad is stupid, even criminal, but it is insane to import unassimilable ethnic groups into Western countries, thus replicating in the West the Third World conflicts that Chua so terrifyingly describes.

Chua's report on ethnic conflict supports the undrawn conclusion, revolutionary for the political Left, that successful states are states with homogeneous populations. Even in ethnically or racially homogeneous states, ideologies such as communism can create class conflicts that are as murderous as ethnic conflicts. Life can be dangerous enough without a heterogeneous population seething with grievances. When a political system has to cope simultaneously with race, gender, ethnic, cultural, and class Marxism, social and political instability are guaranteed. Multiculturalism, not "free market democracy," is setting the world on fire. ■

Paul Craig Roberts is the co-author with Lawrence M. Stratton of The Tyranny of Good Intentions: How Prosecutors and Bureaucrats Are Trampling the Constitution in the Name of Justice.

Guaranteed

CONDEMNED



The Triumph of Liberty—Jim Powell chronicles the inspirational stories of 65 individuals who have advocated and defended liberty. This book gives you moving examples of true heroes of freedom including: William Penn, Ben Franklin, Adam Smith, Booker T. Washington, Ronald Reagan, and many more. **Item #5550**

Retail \$35.00



Final Days—"Disgraceful." That was former president Jimmy Carter's word for the final days of the Clinton administration. But as the late Barbara Olson shows in this riveting book, it was worse than disgraceful; it was well-nigh criminal. **Item #5864**

Retail \$27.95



When Character Was King—At last: a real insider's look at Ronald Reagan—that fully reveals why he's one of the greatest men of our time. Refreshingly free of the made-up characters and sneering liberal bias that mar other portraits of Reagan, Peggy Noonan at last brings you a well-rounded picture of this modern hero. **Item #5912**

Retail \$24.95



Epidemic—*Epidemic* breaks the story that STDs among adolescents has indeed reached epidemic proportions, and is leaving our kids open to deadly infections, infertility and cancer. Dr. Meeker, who has spent the past 20 years practicing pediatric and adolescent medicine and counseling teens, uncovers the facts about this grave health crisis, and the powerful political and other interests that continue to make it worse. **Item #6086**

Retail \$24.95



The Real Lincoln—Though Abraham Lincoln will forever be remembered for freeing the slaves, that was never one of his chief political aims. What was? According to Thomas DiLorenzo, Lincoln devoted his entire political career to revolutionizing the American form of government from one that was very limited in scope and highly decentralized to a highly centralized, activist state. **Item # 5958**

Retail \$24.95



The Quest for Cosmic Justice—Leading conservative scholar Thomas Sowell demolishes both the practical and moral claims of America's social utopians. He sees a "quiet repeal of the American Revolution" that diminishes our liberties under the guise of "social justice" and progressive utopian ideals. His vision can help combat this downward spiral. **Item #5392**

Retail \$25.00




Let Freedom Ring

Known for his forthright, courageous style, Hannity pulls no punches declaring that if the Left prevails, the well-being of future generations will be in peril. In his book, Sean shows why liberalism is bankrupt on a variety of issues: terrorism and national security, border security, the economy, taxes, liberal media bias, environmentalism, education, faith, character and the family, and more.

Item #6024 Retail \$25.95

New York Times
Best-Seller



When I Was a Kid, This Was a Free Country

So much has changed since G. Gordon Liddy was a kid—and not for the better. In the latest book from the smash-hit radio host, *When I Was a Kid, This Was a Free Country*, he surveys the damage: restrictive gun control laws, bewilderingly complicated and limiting environmental regulations, politically correct strangleholds on free speech and free thought, and even encroachments on our property rights and due process of law.

Item #6070 Retail \$27.95



Showdown—In *Showdown*, Larry Elder takes on the most powerful obstacle to our nation's continued existence as a free society: the increasingly intrusive nanny state—along with the entrenched media elite and special interest groups that support its encroachments on our freedoms. **Item #6071**

Retail \$24.95




Death of the West—American policies have turned white Americans into second-class citizens. And, if we don't pay attention, Buchanan proves the worst is yet to come. This NYT Best-Seller, shows how the U.S. could become a Third-World nation by 2050, unless we take action now. **Item #5909**

Retail \$25.95



The Age of Reagan—By most accounts, the year 1964 was a disastrous one for conservatives. The Democratic Party gained its biggest majorities since the glory days of the New Deal. Meanwhile, the conservative movement was quietly aligning itself behind a new leader who would bring it to national dominance. **Item #5855**

Retail \$35.00



Shooting Straight—Wayne LaPierre and James Jay Baker show you how fight back against Leftists who want to steal your guns and leave you defenseless. Armed with this book, you'll be prepared to struggle against the left-wing zealots who would threaten your livelihood, your family, and your very life. **Item #6023**

Retail \$27.95



Theodore Rex—In 1979, Edmund Morris took the reading public by storm with *The Rise of Theodore Roosevelt*, the first in a projected three-volume series and winner of both the Pulitzer Prize and the American Book Award. Now, more than two decades later, Morris has delivered the second installment, covering Roosevelt's presidential years (1901–1909). **Item #5951**

Retail \$35.00



What's So Great About America—America is under attack not only from terrorists, but from leftists, Europeans, and militant Islamic intellectuals who all blame America for every ill in the world. In *What's So Great About America*, best-selling author Dinesh D'Souza takes on all of America's critics and proves them wrong. **Item #5966**

Retail \$22.95

**Since 1964, the Conservative Book Club
has delivered the truth!**

ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Guaranteed

RIGHT


**Take 3 Books
for \$1 Each**



Slander

Prominent liberals—desperate to gain even more political power in America—pull no punches in their effort to defame and discredit conservatives. And their pals in the media are forever letting them get away with it. But finally Ann Coulter stands up to call their bluff.
Item #5985 Retail \$25.95

New York Times
Best-Seller



Fighting Back

What did President Bush do on September 11th when he discovered that America was under terrorist attack? How did he plan the war on terror? What is his strategy? *Fighting Back* is the ultimate insider account of the Bush presidency during this unprecedented period.
Item #6076 Retail \$27.95

**TAKE 3 BOOKS FOR \$1 EACH
PLUS A 4TH FOR \$7.95**




Islam Unveiled—Here at last is a book that dares to tell the truth about Islam—and to show you exactly why this religion is so easy to "hijack," and what Islamic authorities really teach about such barbarities!
Item #6008

Retail \$24.95



Invasion—Give us your tired, your poor... your terrorists, torturers and criminal scum? You will not read a more shocking account of just how porous America's borders have become than this book. *Invasion* is based on exhaustive research and interviews with dozens of current and former immigration officials.
Item #6063

Retail \$27.95



Why We Fight—The "Blame-America-First" crowd came out of the woodwork after 9/11, preaching the same self-doubt that has undermined our national confidence for decades. *Why We Fight* eviscerates the culture of appeasement, explaining in no uncertain terms why the war on terrorism is worth fighting.
Item #5956

Retail \$19.95



Breakdown—Ace reporter Bill Gertz reveals how, since the 1970s, liberals have ravaged the CIA and FBI until both have degenerated into "welfare bureaucracies," saturated with the doctrine of appeasement and incapable of effective clandestine operations.
Item #6007

Retail \$27.95

100% Satisfaction Guaranteed

INSTANT SAVINGS! Join today and get any 3 of the books pictured in this ad for just \$3 plus shipping and handling. Then take up to two years to buy four more books at regular low Club prices (20–50% below retail) or three books over two years, if you've selected the New Member Bonus. After you have paid for your books, your Membership can be ended by you or the Club. Plus you will also get opportunities to buy from our list of Superbargain books that the Club regularly offers. These books are offered at 70–90% discounts!! (Sorry, Superbargain books don't count toward your book commitment.)

SHOP AT HOME CONVENIENCE! Up to 15 times a year you will receive the Club Bulletin packed with the kind of books you will want to read and own. Each bulletin will describe a Featured Selection chosen just for our members. If you want to receive the Featured Selection, do nothing and it will be sent to you. If you don't want the Featured Selection or you would like an alternate selection, simply indicate your wishes on the handy card enclosed with your Bulletin and return it before the deadline date. CBC is an easy way to build your conservative library from the comfort of your own home.

CBC ONLINE! You can now read about and conveniently order CBC books from our new website. Same discounts apply, of course. And, with regularly scheduled live chats with our authors and members-only bulletin boards, you can keep up with the conservative community on a range of important issues.

100% SATISFACTION GUARANTEED! If you are not completely satisfied with any book, return it and receive a complete credit. Plus you will always have at least ten days to make your decision to receive the Featured Selection. If you ever have less than ten days, you simply return the book at Club expense for a full credit. One Membership per household please.

Join online at www.ConservativeBookClub.com

☒ **YES!** Please enroll me as a **Preferred Member of the Conservative Book Club** under the terms outlined in this ad. Send me the 3 books I've indicated and bill me just \$3, plus shipping and handling. I then need to buy only four additional books at regularly discounted club prices over the next two years. *Please write book numbers here:*

_____ # _____ # _____ **C1074AX**

☐ **YES!** I want to take advantage of the **New Member Bonus!** Please send me a 4th selection as I've indicated below. I understand I will be billed an additional \$7.95, plus shipping and handling. I then need to buy only three additional books at regular club prices over the next two years. *Please write book number here:*

_____ **C1074AY**

Name _____

Address _____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____

Email _____

* Prices slightly higher in Canada • Membership subject to approval by the Conservative Book Club

www.ConservativeBookClub.com

Fill out this coupon and mail to: **CONSERVATIVE BOOK CLUB®**

1146 LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG PO BOX 97196, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20090-7196

ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Mitzna for Prime Minister

I recently had a very pleasant dream. A nice Christmas present, in fact. Amram Mitzna, the mayor of Haifa and leader of the Israeli Labor Party, wins the parliamentary

election of next January, which in turn causes Norman Podhoretz and William Kristol to accuse Israelis of anti-Semitism and to demand that George W. Bush send in the Marines. Alas, then I woke up.

It is not going to happen—the victory of Amram Mitzna, that is—not that it will stop Podhoretz and Kristol from shouting foul whenever possible. Mitzna seems a hell of a fellow. He has a history of discord with Sharon, asking to be relieved from his command in 1982, claiming he had no confidence in Sharon as defense minister in charge of the Lebanon invasion. His finest hour as mayor was two years ago when he stood alone to address an angry mob of Israeli Arabs in Haifa. It was the beginning of the second intifada, with clashes all over Israel in which police had shot 13 demonstrators dead. The crowd had turned ugly, and the police tried to stop him. He nevertheless went out, addressed the demonstrators, and they dispersed peacefully. His message was “We have lived together in the past and will do so in the future.” Hear, hear!

Mitzna's bravery is clear: 57 years old, he served for 30 years in the army, was wounded three times in one day during the Six-Day War, and commanded the Israeli forces in the West Bank. No peacenik he. His plan for peace is simple: there can be no military solution to the Palestinian uprising, and the only prospect for peace is to withdraw from the land occupied in 1967 and to dismantle most of the Jewish settlements

there. He has said that ruling 3.5 million Palestinians against their will cannot work and will only serve to destroy Israel economically as well as morally. Again, hear, hear!

What I find very depressing is the inability of samurai warriors like those mentioned above to comprehend that occupation does not work. It never has in the past, and never will. As Mitzna puts it, “We have been strong and brave in war. Now we must be even braver in peace.” Actually, it makes sense. One should never change a winning game and always change a losing one. Sharon promised peace and prosperity, and look at the shape of Israel today. The country's bad economic situation is linked to controlling 3.5 million Palestinians against their will. The latest plan, the real symbol of what is happening, is

idents. When Israel first built a fence in Gaza during the 1987-1993 intifada, it allowed Israel to control 16 settlements in the Gaza Strip as well as all Palestinian movement. Ten years later, Israel controls 50 percent of Gaza, squeezing the already overcrowded area and 1.2 million Palestinians. Building a wall around the West Bank means that the Palestinians living there will suffer the same fate as their Gaza counterparts. This has always been the Sharon master plan. (Incidentally, if this plan brings peace, I'm Monica Lewinsky.)

The Iraqi war plans, needless to say, suit Sharon and his disciples over here to the proverbial T. The war will help Sharon further his territorial strategy, which includes entire Palestinian communities being subject to continued curfews that fail to make the nightly news and large-scale new projects to expand the illegal settlements on the West Bank. While President Bush is busy with the war against Saddam, Sharon will be expanding and consolidating his objec-

ISRAEL'S BAD ECONOMIC SITUATION IS LINKED TO CONTROLLING 3.5 MILLION PALESTINIANS AGAINST THEIR WILL.

the security barrier Israel is building around the West Bank and Jerusalem, twice as long and three times as high as the ... Berlin Wall. Tear down this wall, Mr. Sharon, says Mitzna, but no one over here in the good old U.S.A seems to be listening.

Just picture it. By building the monster, Israel will unilaterally annex a substantial part of the West Bank and tighten military cordons around Palestinian centers, imprisoning their resi-

tives in the Occupied Territories. Worse, concepts once considered unspeakable, such as ethnic cleansing, are now being bandied about, euphemistically known as “transfers.” Sharon has long seen Jordan as the natural home for Palestinians. If the Iraq war topples King Abdullah, so much the better. Turning the West Bank into already tiny Bantustans will go unnoticed as we fight Iraq. It is a good plan, if one believes, as Sharon does, in a Greater Israel encompassing

all of the Occupied Territories. In the meantime, he has failed to deliver on security, on peace, on the economy, and the general quality of Israeli life. Yet he's favored to win big in January.

My Christmas dream was just that, nothing more.

■

If you thought comedy was dead, consider what the British government recently did. It banned the use of the word "homosexual" following complaints from the gay community. What will they ask for next? For heterosexuals to be called abnormal?

The word was first coined in 1869 as a euphemism for the offensive word "sodomite." "Homosexual" is a medical term, according to the gay community, and no one wants to be defined as a diagnosis. Furthermore, when drafting legislation, homosexuals—oops, sorry, gays—will be referred to as "orientation towards people of the same sex" (OTPOTSS). The words "lesbian," "bisexual" and "transsexual" will, however, be acceptable.

What I don't get is why "gay" is a euphemism for "homosexual," and why "orientation of people of the same sex" is a euphemism for "gay." All this does is confuse the issue and create as many linguistic problems as it solves. Mind you, I will continue to use the word homosexual in my *Spectator* column for as long as the fuzz doesn't arrest me. But if you don't hear from me for awhile, it's because I'm back in the slammer for using a banned word. Where is George Orwell now that we really need him?

■


The demise of the old-fashioned love letter is a loss romantics the world over will always mourn. It costs the price of



a stamp, it takes some effort and a little time, but the result is everlasting. No one, not even the philistines that rule our culture nowadays, throws a love letter away. My father, a great Casanova in the European tradition (we never divorce, never turn in the old for a new model, but reserve the right to discreetly cheat like hell) used to turn them out effortlessly and reaped a generous harvest in return. He once admitted to a friend that the best love note he ever received simply stated, "I do love you." Love letters do not have to be long.

What is truly sad about the death of the love letter is that an entire aspect of romantic expression known to our grandparents has now vanished. Back in the good old days, people got to know each other through words rather than through deeds, i.e., syntax rather than sex. Mind you, can you see Ben Affleck writing to Jennifer Lopez and vice versa, "Like, you know, like, ah, like you know..."?

Women, far more than men, are the victims of the love letter's demise. They like to be wooed, and nothing is better for a courtship battle than a letter. And it is far harder to win a woman's heart than to win her body. Robert Browning won Elizabeth Barrett through the written word, not the spoken one. Furthermore, shyness does not inhibit when writing. At least not nearly as much as it does when speaking. This is why today's lack of love letters is a paradox. We are a far more prurient society, exposing ourselves in the most ludicrous manner, yet we will not write from the heart. We real conservatives should re-invent the love letter.

To all our faithful readers, Happy Christmas! ■





MUST READ

Whistleblower – the acclaimed monthly magazine of the Internet's leading independent newssite WorldNetDaily.com – is fearless, credible, and notoriously truthful.

Each month, Whistleblower focuses like a laser beam on a different topic. Recent editions have included: "Christian persecution," "Gay rights' secret agenda," "The News Mafia," "Shattering the myths of the Middle East," "JIHAD: The radical Islamic threat to America," "The new paganism," and "Dumbed down: The deliberate destruction of America's education system."

What do all these topics have in common? Every one of them impacts directly on your well-being and freedom.

SPECIAL OFFER: For a limited time, subscribe to Whistleblower and receive – FREE – our "Homeland Security" package (a \$15 value), dedicated to keeping Americans both safe and free in a time of terrorism and fear. It includes:

- "JIHAD: The radical Islamic threat to America," widely acclaimed as the best information available on America's newfound enemy.
- "INVASION USA," a mind-boggling look at the problem of America's sieve-like borders, and what must be done to halt the inflow of terrorists into the U.S.
- "AMERICA DEFENSELESS," in which Whistleblower, alone among journalism organizations, offers a blueprint for true national homeland defense.

A one-year Whistleblower subscription including 12 monthly issues – plus your FREE "Homeland Security" package if you act now – costs only \$39.95. To order, you may:

- Call toll-free 1-800-4WNDCOM (1-800-496-3266)
- Visit WorldNetDaily.com's online store, ShopNetDaily.com, or
- Mail your payment for \$39.95 to WorldNetDaily.com Inc., P.O. Box 409, Cave Junction, OR 97523-0409.